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MORE MARKET-ORIENTED THAN THE UNITED
STATES AND MORE SOCIALIST THAN CHINA: A
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC PROPERTY STORY OF
SINGAPORE
Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui †
Abstract: Compared to the more illustrious conceptualization of private property,
the conceptualization of public property remains at a surprisingly infantile stage. The
very definition of public property is ambiguous. This article utilizes a comparative case
study of traffic congestion policies in the United States, China, and Singapore to
highlight the conceptual pitfalls posed by the current confusion on public property. This
article proposes a refined public property framework that offers greater conceptual clarity
on the real issues at stake. In particular, this article argues that “property” in public
property should include regulatory permits while “public” in public property should not
be distracted by the requirement of public access. The allocation considerations of
efficiency and fairness governing conventional public property are equally applicable to
economically valuable regulatory permits. Similarly, public access is a mere form of
allocation that should be changed upon alterations in use pattern arising from
technological advancement and socioeconomic changes.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Public property matters, or at least it should. Compared to the more
illustrious private property, which enjoys legions of books and journal
articles devoted specifically to the discussion and promotion thereof,1 the
conceptualization of public property remains at a surprisingly infantile
stage.2 The very definition of public property is ambiguous. What does the
†
Jianlin Chen is an Assistant Law Professor at the University of Hong Kong, J.S.D. Candidate
(University of Chicago), L.L.M. (University of Chicago), L.L.B. (University of Singapore), and is admitted
to the bar in New York and Singapore. Jiongzhe Cui is a trainee Solicitor (Leung & Lau), P.C.L.L. (City
University of Hong Kong), J.D. (City University of Hong Kong), and L.L.B. (Fudan University). The
authors wish to thank Lisa Bernstein, Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Richard Cullen, Adi Leibovitch, Chien-Chih
Lin and the participants of the Chicago Law School Legal Scholarship Workshop for their insightful
comments and critiques. Nonetheless, all errors are ours alone.
1
E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012); Vincent
Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297 (2009); JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed.
2008); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005); TERRY L. ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO FREEDOM & PROSPERITY (2003).
2
The term “public property” is often featured in the literature. However, this literature tends to fall
into two categories that do not advance a coherent understanding of public property. For a discussion of
the first category of public property in public law and the importance of property ownership as a criterion,
see Angela C. Carmella, Symbolic Religious Expression on Public Property: Implications for the Integrity
of Religious Associations, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 481 (2011); Kate Shelby, Taking Public Interests in
Private Property Seriously: How the Supreme Court Short-Changes Public Property Rights in Regulatory
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“public” in public property entail? Is “public access” a necessary or
sufficient characteristic of public property?3 What does the “property” in
public property cover? Does “property” include regulatory permits 4
allocated and subjected to the same principles allocating conventional public
property, such as land?5 This inquiry is not simply a matter of intellectual
curiosity; it has practical implications for allocating resources and designing
regulatory schemes. One manifestation of the quandary caused by the
underappreciation of public property is traffic congestion policy.
Public roads—a well-recognized form of public property—are
plagued by traffic congestion. Traffic congestion is a major problem in
urban areas of the United States and around the world 6 and imposes
substantial time and fuel costs on motorists. It also results in many negative
externalities not borne by motorists, such as other types of congestion and
environmental damage.7 The open-access nature of roads and the difficulty
commuters face navigating roads make traffic congestion a classic example
of the “tragedy of the commons.”8 Two types of market-based regulatory
Taking Cases, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (2008); Dean Smith, Lawmaking on Federal Lands:
Criminal Liability and the Public Property Exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 313 (2003). For a discussion of the second category on public property through
the comparison of the pros and cons of private property, while assuming that public property is equivalent
to public access (contrary to private property), see William F. Cloran, The Ownership of Water in Oregon:
Public Property vs Private Commodity, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 627 (2011); Carol M. Rose, Romans,
Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 89 (2003); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and the Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). In both categories of literature, the discussion of public
property is ancillary to the main discussion, rather than a targeted inquiry (descriptive or normative) on the
public property concept.
3
See infra Part IV.C.3.
4
Regulatory permits are legal instruments issued by the state to authorize the conduct of certain
activities by private entities, without which the conduct would be illegal. They are termed “administrative
permits” in China, and may also be referred to as licenses, approvals, franchises, and consents.
5
See infra Parts III.B.2 & III.C.1.
6
Michael H. Schuitema, Comment, Road Pricing as a Solution to the Harms of Traffic Congestion,
34 TRANSP. L.J. 81, 85 (2007); ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS 258 (McGraw-Hill 5th ed.
2003); Kenneth A. Small, Urban Traffic Congestion: A New Approach to the Gordian Knot, in READINGS
IN URBAN ECONOMICS: ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 409, 409-10 (Robert W. Wassmer ed., Blackwell 2000).
7
See Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on
Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 894-96 (2010); Jonathan Remy Nash,
Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49
B.C.L. REV. 673, 684-94 (2007); Schuitema, supra note 6, at 84-92. See also Govinda R. Timilsina &
Hari B. Dulal, Urban Road Transportation Externalities: Costs and Choice of Policy Instruments, 26 THE
WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 162, 164-66 (2011) (discussing the various external costs of urban
transportation).
8
Iaione, supra note 7, at 891; Nash, supra note 7, at 683-87. For a discussion addressing why
anticommons is less of a concern for public roads even in a socialist state such as China, see Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 621 (1998) (identifying anticommons as another possible form of inefficient property arrangement
whereby too many entities have veto power over the resources). The authority to manage road usage is
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approaches have been touted as appropriate solutions to these problems.
These approaches are price-based instruments (such as congestion pricing)
and quantity-based instruments (such as license quotas on vehicle ownership
or usage.)9
This article’s comparative analysis of congestion management policies
in the United States, China, and Singapore reveals an interesting paradox.
Market-based mechanisms are more widely adopted in Singapore than in the
United States.
Singapore is often the pioneering jurisdiction in
implementing market-based regulatory solutions such as price-based
instruments and quantity-based instruments. 10 This is somewhat ironic,
given the United States’ perceived cultural and ideological affinity for
market and property rights, which theoretically enables greater and faster
implementation of market-based regulatory solutions.11 More intriguingly,
Singapore’s adoption of market-based mechanisms has a distinctive socialist
flair. A key justification that resonates in the Singapore policy-making
process is that the government has a responsibility to collect fair value for
regulatory permits or public resources allocated to private entities.12 This
seeming obsession with preventing the squandering of public resources by
transferring them to private entities is common in a socialist regime such as
China, where public property has been elevated to near-sacred status.13 That
said, the market mechanisms championed in Singapore under the banner of
public property protection are conspicuously absent in China’s traffic
congestion policies.14
distributed relatively coherently among the government entities, with local government having the
autonomy to regulate roads within its jurisdiction and the central government retaining an overriding veto
via the legislation of national. See Daolu Anquan fa (道路安全法) [Road Safety Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2003, effective May 1, 2004) , art. 4 & 5 (China).
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.
11
Katina Miriam Wyman, Why Regulators Turn to Tradeable Permits: A Canadian Case Study, 52
U. TORONTO L.J. 419, 420-21 & n.6 (2002); see also Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the
Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 534-38 (2007) (noting with skepticism the
United States’ unquestioning preference for market solutions).
12
See, e.g., Certificate of Entitlement, 63 HANSARD (Sing.) Col. 727, Col. 730 (Minister for
Communications, Mah Bow Tan) (1994) (“It is the Government’s responsibility to collect the market price
for the [vehicle license quota] and to use the substantial revenue so collected for public projects which can
benefit everyone.”); infra Part III.C.
13
See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 12 (2004) (China) (“Socialist public property is inviolable. The
state protects socialist public property. Appropriation or damaging of state or collective property by any
organization or individual by whatever means in prohibited.”); Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The
Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 317, 325-28 (2008) (discussing the concept of socialism and the role of public property); infra Part
III.B.1.
14
See infra Part III.B.
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This article utilizes perceptions of public property to explain the
above paradox. Regulatory permits are not typically conceived of as
property in Chinese jurisprudence. Therefore, the market-based allocation
of regulatory permits—such as using vehicle license quotas to control
congestion—is subject to strong criticism by Chinese academics and
government officials. The criticism remains regardless of the substantial
economic value conferred on the recipients of these regulatory permits,
which includes the ability of the recipients to “sell” these ostensibly nontransferable permits via creative legal instruments.15 By contrast, regulatory
permits are recognized as property under Reich’s “new property” in the
United States.16 Although U.S. courts have recognized regulatory permits as
property, 17 these permits are not sufficiently valued when compared to
conventional public property, such as government contracts and the ability to
obtain land.18
In addition, under the current conceptualization of public property in
the United States, a defining characteristic is the right of public access. This
right unduly fuses the issue of ownership with the choice of allocation
mechanism. Notwithstanding the fact that public roads have been the poster
child of accessible public property since Roman times,19 the high demand for
roads and the substantial negative externalities that road usage imposes20 has
been an ill-suited allocation mechanism for public roads. Congestion
charges, although widely regarded as a better allocation of scarce road space,
remain fraught with opposition. Many feel that the public has an “inherent
right” to access roads, and imposing monetary charges harms the use of
public roads.21
By using a comparative analysis of public property, this article
advances a refined framework of public property to offer greater conceptual
clarity on the following issues. For one, the definition of “property” in
public property must be sufficiently broadened to include regulatory permits
and other regulatory actions that bestow substantial economic value on
15

See infra Part II.C.
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778-85 (1963); infra Part IV.C.1.
17
See, e.g., Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due Process of
Law: Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161, 172-77
(2009) (summarizing various U.S. court cases addressing state-created property); Amnon Lehavi, Mixing
Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 156-58 (2008) (discussing the adjustment of the property regime to
maintain an individual’s “legitimate claim of entitlement”).
18
Infra Part IV.C.2.
19
Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators, supra note 2, at 96-97.
20
Public access should be distinguished from public free access. The frequent conflating of the two
by commentators exacerbates the problems caused by treating public access as a defining characteristic of
public property. See infra Parts IV.C.3, V.A.2.
21
Infra Part V.A.2.
16
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recipients. Important considerations, such as efficiency and loss of public
revenue, are implicated by allocating both “regulatory property” and
conventional public properties, such as land use and government contract.
Further, the concept of “public” in public property should not
necessarily require public access. Public access is merely a form of
allocating property. It may have been historically the most efficient
allocation mechanism, but this tradition should not impede society from
adopting other allocation mechanisms, particularly in light of changes in
road use patterns due to technological advancement and socio-economic
changes.
Part II of this article presents the theoretical literature on traffic
congestion management and the policies implemented in the United States,
China, and Singapore. Part III identifies Singapore’s greater use of marketbased mechanisms, which has a socialist emphasis on public property
protection. Thereafter, the article compares the concepts of public property
in the three jurisdictions. Part IV proposes a refined framework of public
property by drawing on the strengths and weaknesses of the different
concepts of public property in the three jurisdictions. Part IV also addresses
possible objections related to redistribution considerations and perverse
government incentives to generate revenue. Part V advances a framework of
public property that involves a broad, economic understanding of property to
include regulatory permits and a reorientation of public that focuses on
public ownership and not public access.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TRAFFIC CONGESTION POLICIES

II.

Traffic congestion is a major problem in the urban areas of the United
States and around the world. 22 Studies have estimated that the total
congestion costs in sixty-eight major urban regions in the United States was
USD 78 billion, or 0.84% of the U.S. GDP, in 1999. 23 In addition, the
continuous rapid increase in transportation demand has aggravated the aging
and deteriorating transportation infrastructure in United States. 24 Traffic
congestion imposes substantial time and fuel costs to motorists and also
imposes many other costs that are not borne by motorists, such as other

22

Schuitema, supra note 6, at 85; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 258; Small, supra note 6, at 409-10.
Timilsina & Dulal, supra note 7, at 165.
24
Carlos Sun, The Toll Road Not Taken: Could the One Option Less Used Make a Difference?, 21
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 280, 281-82 (2012).
23
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types of congestion and environmental costs. 25 Together, along with the
open-access nature of roads and the virtual impossibility for the vast number
of commuters to coordinate their road usage through negotiation, these
negative externalities render traffic congestion a classic example of the
“tragedy of the commons.”26 With little incentive to take into account the
social costs they impose, individual motorists overuse the roads for their
own benefit at the expense of society.27
It is usually not controversial to have the government recognize that
some form of intervention is required to remedy the problem of traffic
congestion. However, there is little consensus on the appropriate regulatory
response. Regulatory responses can be broadly classified into commandand-control regulations and market-based mechanisms. 28 Command-andcontrol regulations are relatively rare in the realm of traffic congestion
policies and include parking controls; employer-based mandatory trip
reduction programs; and “odds and evens” license plate vehicle
authorization systems, where only vehicle owners whose numbered plates
are odd may use the roads on odd days of the week.29 Due to the prevailing
consensus that command-and-control regulations are inefficient, these
practices have not been emphasized in discussions on viable policy
alternatives. 30 That said, they are still occasionally relied on in other
jurisdictions as a last-ditch measure to curb traffic usage during sudden
spikes in road-usage demand.31
Market-based mechanisms can be divided into schemes based on price
or quantity.32 Congestion pricing—typically a toll that is levied on vehicle
travel during peak hours—is often touted as a market-based policy response

25
See e.g., Iaione, supra note 7, at 894-96; Nash, supra note 7, at 684-94; Schuitema, supra note 6,
at 84-92; see Timilsina & Dulal, supra note 7, at 164-66 (discussing the various external costs of urban
transportation).
26
Iaione, supra note 7, at 891; Nash, supra note 7, at 683-90. Tragedy of the commons refers to the
overexploitation of communally shared resources by individuals seeking to maximize their own profit in
the use of resources while disregarding the social costs of their actions, including the long-term benefit to
the community arising from the preservation of resources. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
27
Iaione, supra note 7, at 891; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 260-62; Small, supra note 6, at 410-11.
28
Iaione, supra note 7, at 905-06; Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REV. 275, 275-78 (2000).
29
Timothy D. Hau, Instruments for Charging Congestion Externalities, in ROAD PRICING: THEORY,
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT AND POLICY 223, at 223-24 (Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson eds., 1995).
30
See Iaione, supra note 7, at 905-06; Nash, supra note 7, at 708.
31
See Beijing cheliang jinqi an weihao xianxing [Beijing Vehicle Usage Restricted by Last Number
of Vehicle Plate From Today], LIANHE ZAOBAO (Sing.), Oct. 11, 2008 (describing the restrictions of
vehicles usage in Beijing).
32
Iaione, supra note 7, at 906-11; Merrill, supra note 28, at 276.
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to congestion that relies on price incentives. 33 By assigning a price that
theoretically internalizes the externalities of road usage, it is left to
prospective road users to decide whether or not to pay the toll and use the
roads.34 Economists widely regard congestion pricing as an effective way to
achieve social efficiency because it forces motorists to internalize the
external costs. 35 It is also justified philosophically based on the benefit
principle of taxation, where “consumers of government services should be
taxed in proportion to the benefit they receive.”36
Conversely, quantity-based instruments set limits on the usage of
roads. 37 Such instruments include issuing limited numbers of vehicle
ownership licenses and limited numbers of entry permits in urban centers.38
Quantity-based instruments incorporate market mechanisms when the
permits are allocated to the highest valuers in the market, such as by
allowing allocated permits to be subsequently transferred. Professor
Christian Iaione argued in favor of quantity control over price mechanisms
because under the former method the optimal usage of a given road could be
better ascertained, as opposed to the latter method which requires, for
example, the determination of marginal congestion cost of one additional
vehicle.39
III.

TRAFFIC CONGESTION POLICIES COMPARED

This part presents the theoretical literature on traffic congestion
management and the different policies implemented in the United States,
China, and Singapore.

33
See Iaione, supra note 7, at 907; Nash, supra note 7, at 704-05; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 26266; Small, supra note 6, at 409-10.
34
See Nash, supra note 7, at 706-09; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 262-64.
35
See Sun, supra note 24, at 283; Timilsina & Dulal, supra note 7, at 168-69; Nash, supra note 7, at
704-715; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 93-96; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, Road Congestion Pricing in
Singapore: 1975 to 2003, 43(2) TRANSP. J. 16, 17 (2004). For a comparison of congestion pricing with
other price-based mechanisms such as gasoline tax, parking tax, and subsidies for public transits, see
O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 262-73 (noting how these measures are insufficiently sensitive to the problem
of excessive travel during peak hours). See also Michael E. Levine, Airport Congestion: When Theory
Meets Reality, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 41-44 (2009) (discussing the efficiency of congestion charges in the
context of airport congestion).
36
Sun, supra note 24, at 283.
37
See Iaione, supra note 7, at 906-07.
38
See id. at 929-37.
39
Id. at 908-10.
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The United States’ Flirtation with Market-Based Instruments

Despite academic advocacy, the United States has not implemented
the above market-based approaches to traffic congestion. There are
currently no quantity-based instruments in the United States. In terms of
price instruments, only limited routes in New Jersey, California, Texas, and
Florida feature congestion pricing through the use of tolls.40 Texas’s plan
was a subject of the 2008 study by the U.S. Department of Transportation.41
Despite the strong commitment and political will of former New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, his repeated attempts to introduce congestion
pricing to address traffic problems in Manhattan were stalled in the
legislative process.42 This is both telling and unfortunate because the liberaloriented, congestion-plagued, geographically-constrained New York City is
arguably “the setting in the United States in which congestion pricing would
face the least opposition.”43
Such limited implementation is not surprising as “public reaction to
congestion pricing tends to be strong and negative.”44 One main objection to
congestion pricing is that it is inherently unfair; the fees impose barriers to
travel for those with less income. 45 Of course, there is also the general
resistance against paying for an item that was previously free. 46 Other
objections include privacy concerns, disquiet over the use of market-based
approaches, and the potential negative effect on local business. 47
Nonetheless, these objections are not insurmountable. For example, the
concerns of equity and new taxes can simply be resolved by providing
subsidies to the poor or allocating the revenue collected towards public
transportation or other like benefits.48 Concerns about privacy and utilizing
a market-based approach can also be tackled through a properly designed
pricing scheme.49
40
U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., LIST OF PROJECTS BY TYPE,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/projectlist.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2013). Tolls at bridges may
sometimes incorporate congestion pricing elements by varying the toll charges in accordance to the time of
travel. See, e.g., A Year of Growth: One Year of SR 520 Tolling in the Books, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec.
26, 2016 (describing the SR 520 Bridge in Seattle).
41
See Nash, supra note 7, at 678 n.44.
42
Iaione, supra note 7, at 919-21; Nash, supra note 7, at 735.
43
Nash, supra note 7, at 734.
44
Nash, supra note 7, at 726; see Small, supra note 6, at 409.
45
Sun, supra note 24, at 284; Nash, supra note 7, at 726-27; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 107-09.
46
Nash, supra note 7, at 728; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 109-10.
47
Nash, supra note 7, at 728-29; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 110-12. Parking garages within the
tolled areas are also affected and are likely to oppose such measures. See, e.g., Iaione, supra note 7, at 919
(parking garages joining as plaintiffs in litigations opposing toll measures in New York City).
48
Schuitema, supra note 6, at 107-09; Nash, supra note 7, at 730; see Iaione, supra note 7, at 911.
49
See Nash, supra note 7, at 729-30.
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In practice, the construction of new roads and new lanes is a common
and popular policy response to traffic congestion, 50 even though this
response only increases capacity and does not address the issue of efficiency
and efficacy in traffic congestion. An increase in road capacity merely
ameliorates congestion temporarily without tackling the root problem of
driving.51 Individual drivers will still fail to take into account the congestion
externalities imposed by one’s road usage on other road users. In addition,
building more roads may simply induce more travel, particularly over time.52
The popularity of increasing road capacity as a policy response to congestion
reflects the strong support of powerful interest groups. 53 These interest
groups include the automobile and construction industries, which enjoy the
benefits of increased demand for road transportation and road construction,
respectively. 54 Further, property developers, property owners, and local
businesses along the new roads stand to reap significant benefits from
increased road accessibility and are thus strong supporters of such projects.55
The local economy also benefits from increased employment and public
expenditures, particularly if the funds are from a higher level (e.g., federal
funding in the United States).56
B.

China’s Evolution on Vehicle License Quotas and Congestion Pricing

The rapidly increasing demand for road transportation caused by
China’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades has rendered
traffic congestion a persistent problem in major Chinese urban population
centers. The headline grabbing stories of traffic congestions in Beijing
during 2010 57 underscored the endemic congestion problem in Chinese
50

Iaione, supra note 7, at 892; Nash, supra note 7, at 694-95.
Nash, supra note 7, at 695.
52
Nash, supra note 7, at 694-700; Iaione, supra note 7, at 892; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 269-70.
53
Nash, supra note 7, at 701-03; see also Iaione, supra note 7, at 902-03.
54
See Iaione, supra note 7, at 902-03.
55
Nash, supra note 7, at 701.
56
Id. at 701-03. The distinction between local and central government funding is not an issue in the
city-state of Singapore. In China, the Ministry of Transport is the central government agency on
transportation and a major funding provider for road construction throughout the country. For a breakdown
on
the
central
government
funding
received
by
the
respective
provinces,
see
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/tongjigongbao/tongjishuju/gonglushuiyunyewu/gudingzichan_TZWC/
(last visited July 15, 2013).
57
For a discussion on how the already dismal traffic conditions in major Chinese cities are often
aggravated to a city-wide standstill by external factors such as bad weather (e.g. heavy snow or rainfall) or,
in this particular instance, an eve of a long weekend where there is increased vehicle traffic both into and
out of the city, see Guo Chao et al., Zuowan Gaofeng Yongdu Huduan Pobei [Number of Highly Congested
Road Sections Exceed Hundred Last Night], THE BEIJING NEWS, Sept. 20, 2010, at A10.
51
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cities. 58 In addition to ramping up road construction, 59 the Chinese
municipal governments in several major cities have introduced quotas on
vehicle licenses to curb the growth in vehicle use. This section examines the
different allocation mechanisms adopted by different Chinese cities and
discusses the resistance to congestion pricing.
1.

Allocations of Vehicle License Quotas

Aside from the question of how many vehicle licenses should be
issued under the quota system, the key issue is how these vehicle licenses
should be allocated. This section traces the evolution of the allocation
mechanisms from market auctions in Shanghai, to random lotteries in
Beijing and Guiyang, and finally to a hybrid compromise in Guangzhou that
is part auction and part lottery.
a.

Market auctions in Shanghai

Shanghai, the largest Chinese urban population center, was the first
city in China to set up a vehicle license quota program in response to
growing urban congestion.60 The first competitive auction was held in 1994
to allocate a limited number of vehicle licenses. 61 Prior to 2000, the
mechanism was a closed auction with reserve prices, such that the bidders
did not know about other bids until the bidding was over and the bids were
required to be above the stipulated minimum price. 62 The municipal
government converted the closed auction to an open auction without reserve
prices as of 2001. 63 Vehicle licenses for imported cars were initially
auctioned separately and were usually sold at a price several times higher
58

For a government sponsored survey on traffic conditions in Chinese cities, see Zhongke Yuan
Gongbu 50 Chengshi Shangban Haoshi Paiming Beijing 52 Genzhong Jushou [The Chinese Academy of
Sciences Announces Ranking on Commuting, Beijing Top the List of 50 Cities with 52 Minutes], WEST
CHINA METROPOLIS DAILY, Jun. 6, 2010, available at http://news.qq.com/a/20100606/000160.htm.
59
E.g., GUANGZHOU PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, JIJI GOUJIAN YITI HUA LITI JIAOTONG
WANG LOU DAZAO XIANDAI HUA QUNIU XING JIAOTONG JICHU SHESHI TIXI [PROACTIVELY SET UP A UNIFIED
3D TRANSPORTATION NETWORK TO CONSTRUCT A MODERN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE HUB SYSTEM]
(February 20, 2012) http://www.gdcsgj.com/ReadArt.asp?ArtID=1027 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
60
See Luo Wei & Wang Jintao, Chepai Paimai de Lilun Yanjiu yu Shizheng Fenxi [Theoretical
Research and Empirical Analysis of Vehicle License Auction], 9(6) SCI. TECH. & ENGINEERING (CHINA)
1466 (2009).
61
Id.
62
See Hu Xiyin, Shanghai: 4 Wanyuan Yikuai Chepai neng Jiejue Wenti ma? [Theoretical Research
and Empirical Analysis of Vehicle License Auction], 2004(3) CHINA SOC’Y PERIODICAL 51 (2004).
63
See Yang Xiaojun & Huang Quan, Shanghai Jidong Chepai Paimai Xinwei de hefa xing Renshi
[Recognizing the Legality of Motor Vehicle License Auction: Interpreting Article 12 & 15 of the
Administrative Permit Law], 2005(4) ADMIN, L. RES. (CHINA) 109 (2005).

JANUARY 2014

A COMPARATIVE PUBLIC PROPERTY STORY OF SINGAPORE

11

than those for local cars. The auctions for the vehicle licenses for imported
and local cars was merged in 2003.64 To reduce speculation, the auction
mechanisms were tweaked slightly in 2008 to allow bid adjustments before
the close of bidding.65 The high demand for cars has pushed the auction
price to record highs, hitting RMB 80,000 in 2013 (approximately
USD 13,000, which is more than the price of some new cars).66
The Shanghai vehicle license quota program is generally effective.
While traffic congestion persists in Shanghai on weekends and public
holidays, the congestion level is generally regarded by Chinese
commentators as significantly better in Shanghai than Beijing, the Chinese
capital and second largest urban population center in China.67 The proceeds
from the auction have also helped subsidize important public transportation
initiatives, such as rebates for public transportation transfers, free public
transportation for the elderly, and subsidies for remote public transportation
routes.68
The neighboring municipality of Wenzhou implemented a similar
vehicle license quota and auction system in 1997, but abolished it in 2007.69
This was not surprising because the auction allocation mechanism was
continuously subject to criticism. In particular, a high level official from the
Ministry of Commerce caused a furor in 2004 by publicly criticizing the
Shanghai measures for imposing a monetary payment for vehicle registration
that exceeded the requirements set forth in the Road Traffic Safety Law.70
There were also concerns by academics that the substantial revenue
64
See Yue Haiyin & Fan Junfen, Shanghai shi Siche Paizhao Paimai de Xingzheng Faxue Sikao
[Reflection of Shanghai Municipal Vehicle Auction from the Administrative Law Perspective], 7(6) J.
NINGXIA COMMUNIST PARTY INST. 95 (2005).
65
See “Chepai” Paimai: Shanghai Zhidu Wangpai [“Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of
Shanghai’s Management of Traffic Congestion], SOUTHERN WEEKEND (CHINA), Apr. 9, 2012, available at
http://news.66wz.com/system/2012/04/09/103111759.shtml (last visited July 30, 2012).

See Shanghai siche Paijie Suoci ‘poba’(上海私车牌价 首次“破八”) [Shanghai Private Vehicle
License Price Exceed Eighty Thousand for the First Time], LIANHE ZAOBAO (Sing.), Feb. 24, 2013; Ai Xin,
Sijia che Xianpai Xiangou hequ Hecong [What Next for Restrictions in Vehicle License], WATER
TRANSPORT J. (CHINA), Sep. 21, 2012; Zhou An, Guangzhou: “yaohao + paipei” nengfou cheng zhidu
liangfang [Guangzhou: Can “Lottery + Auction” be Ideal Solution for Congestion?], TRAFFIC WKLY OF
PUB. SECURITY DAILY (CHINA), July 17, 2012, at 4.
67
Ai Xin, supra note 66.
68
Qiche Xiangou Fengbao Jiangzhi [Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent], ECON. &
NATION WKLY (CHINA), Aug. 20, 2012.
69
Zhang Haipeng, Minge Weiyuan tian Zhongjie Wenzhou Shiche Haopai Paimai Zhidu [Proposal
by Revolutionary Committee Member Led to Termination of Wenzhou Vehicle Auction System], Oct. 6,
2008, available at http://www.minge.gov.cn/txt/2008-10/06/content_2502424.htm (critiquing the
ineffectiveness of auction mechanisms given the lack of travel restrictions on non-Wenzhou registered
vehicles in addition to the hefty price of the measure).
70
“Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of Shanghai’s Management of Traffic Congestion, supra
note 65.
66
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available under such regulatory schemes would distract the government from
genuine public welfare considerations. 71
The opposition to the Shanghai vehicle license quota program has
cumulated into legal actions. In 2011, litigation challenging the lack of any
publicized legal basis for the auction was decided in favor of the government
on the basis that the government’s general reference to the Road Traffic
Safety Law and Auction Law was a sufficient legal basis for the vehicle
license auction.72 Around the same time, Chinese activist lawyers lodged a
complaint with the Shanghai Development and Reform Commission,
alleging that the auction was an illegal administrative monopoly, but this
complaint was dismissed.73 While the Shanghai municipal government has
remained steadfast in the implementation of the auction, it has begun to
proclaim—in an attempt to deflect criticisms—that the auction is only a
temporary measure that will be phased out upon the improvement of overall
traffic conditions.74
b.

“Fair” lottery in Beijing and Guiyang

When it was Beijing’s turn to implement a vehicle license quota in
2011, the controversial auction mechanism was shunned. The Temporary
Regulations on the Control of the Number of Small Vehicles was enacted to
set up a vehicle license quota scheme.75 Instead of using auctions, these
vehicle licenses were allocated in lotteries, where the winner received the
license for free.76 The vehicle license is non-transferable and void if not
exercised within six months. 77 To ensure fairness and transparency, the
71

Peng Xingting, Shanghai Cepai Paimai Zhidu “Bianxing ji” [Evolution of Shanghai Vehicle
License Auction Regime], DECISION-MAKING (CHINA), Apr. 2008, at 57.
72
Hu Lvyin, Shanghai shi Zengfu Cheliang Paizhao Paimai yiju de fali Fenxi [Analysis on the Legal
Basis of Shanghai Municipal Government Vehicle License Auction], 2011(5) LEGAL SCI. MONTHLY
(CHINA) 3, 3 (2011).
73
Wen Jie, Shanghai Fagai wei Huiying fan Longduan Jubao: Chepai Paimai bu Weifa [Shanghai
Development and Reform Commission Respond to Complaint of Monopoly: Vehicle License Auction is not
Illegal], LEGAL DAILY (CHINA), Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://biz.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/
20110428/333854.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
74
“Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of Shanghai’s Management of Traffic Congestion, supra
note 65.
75
Xiao Keche Shuliang Tiaokong Zanxing Guiding ( 北 京 市 小 客 车 数 量 调 控 暂 行 规 定 )
[Temporary Regulations on the Control of the Number of Small Vehicle] (promulgated by Beijing City
Government, Dec. 23, 2010, effective Dec. 23, 2010) (China). The vehicle licenses issued every month are
limited to 20,000. See Liu Zeling & Liu Zhenni, Shoulun Gouche Yaohao 5 miao Yaochu 1.76 wan zhibiao
[First Round of Vehicle License Lottery Produce 17600 Allocation], THE BEIJING NEWS (CHINA), Jan. 27,
2011, at A07.
76
Art. 3, Temporary Regulations on the Control of the Number of Small Vehicle, supra note 75.
77
Id. at art. 6.
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process of the lottery is conducted by high-level government officials and
subject to stringent supervision by notaries and the Ministry of
Supervision. 78 More than 180,000 individuals who met the residency
requirement participated in the first lottery, with a success ratio of 10.6:1.79
Many of those who won did not register a vehicle, and only 35 vehicles were
registered on the first day. 80 This suggests that most participants of the
lottery were not in need of a vehicle.81 The odds were further reduced in
subsequent lotteries, reaching a mere ratio of 47:1 in 2012 with participation
driven not by a genuine need for vehicles, but simply the hope of winning a
prize in a lottery.82 This mismatch between actual vehicle users and lottery
winners of vehicle licenses has led to many under-the-table transactions in
the grey market for vehicle licenses, such as the long-term “rental” of a
vehicle at a huge fee from a lottery winner.83
A similar vehicle license quota scheme was implemented in Guiyang
in 2011. The actual measure differs slightly from that of Beijing. Two types
of vehicle licenses are issued under the new scheme. The first type of
license entitles the vehicle to enter into the inner city area, but the licenses
are restricted in number and allocated by lottery without any charge.84 The
second type of license has no restrictions in quantity but is not permitted to
enter the inner city area.85 Another difference under the Guiyang scheme is
the more relaxed residency requirement, which does not require the license
holder to have continuously paid five years of income tax and social security
contributions to the city.86 The initial lottery of 1,800 vehicle licenses (down
78
79

Liu Zeling & Liu Zhenni, supra note 75.
Id. The success ratio of the Shanghai auction is only 2.8:1 even during periods of high

participation level. See Shanghai Siche Paijie Suoci ‘poba’ 上海私车牌价 首次“破八” [Shanghai
Private Vehicle License Price Exceed Eighty Thousand for the First Time], LIANHE ZAOBAO 联合早报,
Feb. 24, 2013.
80
Liu Zeling, Beijing Yaohao Shangpai Shouri Changmian Lenqing qin 35 Liangche Dengji [Poor
Response on First Day of Registration for Beijing Vehicle License Lottery: Only 35 Vehicle Registrations],
THE BEIJING NEWS (CHINA), Jan. 31, 2011, at A05; see also Zhou An, supra note 66, at 11.
81
Liu Zeling, supra note 80.
82
Ai Xin, supra note 66; Zhou An, supra note 64.
83
Ai Xin, supra note 66; see also Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent, supra note 68;
Zhou An, supra note 66. Under this form of circumvention, persons who need to travel with cars but failed
to win the lottery can sign a long-term vehicle rental contract with lottery winners. Ai Xin, supra note 66.
The latter party will buy and register a car of the “renter’s” choice, and allow the “renter” to use the vehicle
exclusively throughout the term of the contract, which can be several years. Id. In return, the “renter” will
pay the lottery winner the cost of the vehicle in addition to a premium that is essentially the value of the
vehicle license. Id.
84
Shen Liqiong, Guiyang fabu “Xianche ling” [Guiyang Announces Vehicles Restrictions],
July
11,
2011,
available
at
http://gzdsb.gog.com.cn/system/
GUIZHOU CITY NEWS,
2011/07/12/011137503.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
85
Id.
86
Id.
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from a prior monthly average of 4,000) produced a total of 17,258
applications.87 Car buyers often have family members, relatives, and friends
participate in the lottery because each person only has one chance. 88
Statistics suggest that the program was successful one year into its
implementation, with the annual increase in vehicles reduced by half and
average traffic speed in the inner city improved by 28%.89
The free lottery mechanism and purported temporary nature of the
restrictions of the Guiyang measure dampened opposition, although
concerns were expressed about the vehicle license quota scheme being a de
facto restriction on vehicle sales which would violate government policies
for the automobile industry and general economic development. 90 In
particular, the Development and Reform Commission has publicly opined
that the Guiyang measures are contrary to the country’s economic
development plan for the automobile industry.91
c.

Hybrid compromise in Guangzhou

In 2012, Guangzhou, China’s third largest city, became the latest city
to implement a vehicle license quota program. 92 Framed as a temporary
measure with a trial period of one year, vehicle licenses were capped at ten
thousand new vehicles every month. 93 The quota of vehicle licenses
represents a reduction of approximately 47 percent of the average monthly
vehicle growth from the previous year.94 Learning from the pitfalls of high
priced (and allegedly unfair) auctions in Shanghai and from the
inefficiencies of a pure lottery, Guangzhou adopted a hybrid allocation
mechanism. Vehicle licenses are primarily allocated in two different ways:
half through a free lottery and half through an auction with a reserve price of
87
Dingzhe yali Zoushang Xianche Zhilu Guiyang Shoupi Yaochu 1800 ge Xinyun zhe [Adopting
Vehicle Restriction Under Pressure – Guiyang Select 1800 Lucky Persons via Lottery], CHINA
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 5, 2011.
88
Id. One interviewee stated that he had amassed 11 applications through his friends and relatives,
all of which failed. Id.
89
See Zhou An, supra note 66.
90
Shen Liqiong, “Xianche ling”bingbu weifan goujia zhengche [Vehicles Restrictions Does not
Violate Government Policies], GUIZHOU CITY DAILY, July 11, 2011, available at
http://gzdsb.gog.com.cn/system/2011/07/21/011146891.shtml (last visited July 30, 2012).
91
Fagai wei Shouci Manqué Biaotie Guiyang Qiche Xiangou ling Weifan Zhengce [Development
and Reform Commission for the First Time Explicitly States that Guiyang’s Vehicle Purchase Restriction is
Contrary to Policy], ZHONGGUO QICHE GONGYE XINXI, July 20, 2011.
92
See Zhou An, supra note 66; Zeng Shi, Meiyue Xiangou Yiwan Liang Guangzhou Turan Shishi
Qiche Xiangou lin [Guangzhou Suddenly Implement Vehicle Purchase Restrictions of Monthly Quota of
10,000 Vehicles], LIANHE ZAOBAO (SING.), Jul. 2, 2012.
93
Zhou An, supra note 66; Zeng Shi, supra note 92.
94
Zeng Shi, supra note 92.
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RMB 10,000. A small number of vehicle licenses are specifically carved out
for environmentally friendly green vehicles and are allocated via a free
lottery.95 Proceeds of the auction are dedicated to public transportation.96
The initial rounds of allocation produced limited participation that
saw fewer bids in the auction than available licenses.97 The main reason for
the apparent lack of interest is that the vehicle license quota program was not
matched by travel restrictions for vehicles not registered in Guangzhou,
unlike other Chinese municipal vehicle license quota schemes. 98 Vehicle
owners could register their vehicles in neighboring counties and avoid the
fees and hassles of the Guangzhou scheme.99
2.

General Resistance to Congestion Fees

Congestion pricing, the other prominent tool for tackling urban
congestion, has been proposed in Chinese urban centers such as
Guangzhou 100 and Shenzhen. 101 Congestion charges have also been
considered in cities such as Beijing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Chengdu, and
Chongqing.102
Nonetheless, these measures face strong resistance in implementation.
Objections come in many forms. One important reservation is in regard to
the legality and administrative implementation of congestion fees,
particularly when vehicle ownership and usage is subject to a myriad of
95
Guangzhou: xia Yilun Chepai Zhengduo Xingshi heru? [Guangzhou: How is the Next Round of
Vehicle License Auction Shaping Up?], CHINA NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 2012; Zhou An, supra note 66.
96
Zhou An, supra note 66.
97
Guangzhou Jingpai Junjia Jiangjin Wanyuan Xianxing xize Xiangwei Chutai [Guangzhou Auction
Average Price Nearing Ten Thousand Dollars: Detailed Measures on Travel Restriction Remains Absence],
CHINA NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2012; Guangzhou: How is the Next Round of Vehicle License Auction
Shaping Up?, supra note 95, at 15.
98
Guangzhou Auction Average Price Nearing Ten Thousand Dollars: Detailed Measures on Travel
Restriction Remains Absence, supra note 97; Guangzhou: How is the Next Round of Vehicle License
Auction Shaping Up?, supra note 95.
99
Guangzhou Auction Average Price Nearing Ten Thousand Dollars: Detailed Measures on Travel
Restriction Remains Absence, supra note 97.
100
Guangzhou Zhidu Fangan Taolun gao Chulu ni Yanjiu shou Jiaotong Yongdu fei [Guangzhou
Congestion Relief Plan Discussion Draft Released: Studies on Traffic Congestion Charges Planned],
CHINA NEWS NET, Jan. 10, 2011, http://auto.ifeng.com/roll/20110110/508434.shtml (last visited Nov. 1,
2012).
101
Guo Yao & Cao Jing, Shenzheng shi Zhengshi Biaotia nin Shouqu Jiaotong Yongdu fei
[Shengzhen Officially Announcement Plans to Impose Congestion Charges], YANGCHENG EVENING NEWS,
Mar. 8, 2012, http://auto.qq.com/a/20120308/000061.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
102
Difang Lianghui riyi Jiaotong Yongdu fei Cheshi Huozai yu Likong [Vigorous Discussion on
Traffic Congestion Charges in Local Legislature Meetings: Possible Negative Profit Impact on Automobile
Industry], DAILY ECONOMIC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://auto.qq.com/a/20120210/000166.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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taxes and charges. 103 The lack of complementary public transportation
infrastructure and effective traffic management also raise doubts about the
efficacy of congestion charges in actually reducing congestion.104 There is
the inevitable public skepticism about the inequitable and regressive nature
of the charges (favoring the rich and the public authorities) and general
unhappiness about rising costs of living. 105 In addition, there are real
concerns about possible negative effects on the Chinese automobile
industry.106 This is not surprising given the important economic role of the
Chinese automobile industry as a driver for the manufacturing sector and
consumer consumption. Notably, Beijing decided to forego imposing
congestion charges in part to negatively affecting the automobile industry,
which was still feeling the effects of Beijing’s earlier restrictions on vehicle
licenses.107
D.

Singapore’s Epitomization of Market-based Solutions

With five million people packed into a land area of 442 square
miles,108 urban congestion is a persistent concern for the densely populated
island state of Singapore. In sharp contrast to the United States and China,
both price-based and quantity-based market instruments feature prominently
in Singapore’s regulatory responses to traffic congestion. This section
103

Ma Lianhua, Zhengshou Jiatong Yongdu fei re Zengyi Beizhi “qi Zhong zui” [Controversies
Surrounding Imposition of Congestion Charges: Seven Sins], CHINA YOUTH DAILY, Feb. 16, 2012,
available at http://auto.qq.com/a/20120216/000227.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). This argument relies
on Article 63 of Qiche Chanye Fazhan Zhengce 汽车产业发展政策 [Development Policy for Automobile
Industry] (promulgated by National Development and Reform Commission, May. 21, 2004, effective May
21, 2004) (China) that requires at minimum the approval of the State Council (the executive branch of the
central government) before any fees on road utilization can be imposed.
104

Lin Junhui et al., Daibiao Huiyuan Jibian Yongdu fei Jinglu da Dushi huo Chizao bude Bushuo(代

表委员激辩拥堵费 京沪大都市或迟早不得不收 ) [Vigorous Debate on Congestion Charges Among
Representatives: Perhaps an Inevitable Eventualities in Big Urban Cities like Beijing and Shanghai],
GUANGZHOU DAILY, Mar. 12, 2012, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012lh/201203/12/c_122820630.htm (last visited July 30, 2012); Ma Lianhua, supra note 103. Otherwise known in
economic literature as “inelasticity of demand,” the argument posits that the demand for vehicle travel will
remain high even with congestion charges because there are no practical alternatives in the form of public
transport. Lin Junhui et al., supra.
105
Lin Junhui et al., supra note 104; Ma Lianhua, supra note 103.
106
Ma Lianhua, supra note 103. Congestion charges arguably decrease the attractiveness of car
travel and consequently reduces the domestic demand for automobiles.
107
Sun Gan, Beijing Lianghui: Beijing shi Zhanbu Zhengshou Yongdu fei [Beijing Legislative
Meeting: No Congestion Charges for the Moment], JINGHUA TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, available at
http://auto.ifeng.com/news/special/yongdufei/20110117/515380.shtml (last visited July 30, 2012).
108
SINGAPORE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, CENSUS OF POPULATION 2010 STATISTICAL RELEASE 3:
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORT 3 (2011).
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examines Singapore’s twin policies of market-based vehicle license quotas
and congestion pricing.
1.

Certificate of Entitlement: Auctioning of Vehicle Ownership Licenses

The Certificate of Entitlement (“COE”) is a vehicle quota system that
has been in effect since 1990 as a means to control traffic congestion.109 It is
a competitive tender system in which potential vehicle owners bid for a
limited number of car-ownership licenses. 110 Bidding is conducted
electronically by sealed tender with licenses sold at the price of the lowest
successful tender price.111 The strong demand for vehicles and the limited
numbers of licenses have resulted in high prices that often exceed the cost of
new cars.112 The mechanism was tweaked several times in response to the
exploitation of loopholes by car dealers and potential car owners. For
example, because the licenses were initially transferable and could be
applied to any vehicle, speculation in the licenses and a corresponding rise in
prices resulted and eventually led to transfer restrictions. 113 A cheaper
vehicle license that was meant for use on the weekends and could only
operate on weekdays with the purchase of coupons was revamped after
luxury cars owners realized that the savings from the cheaper vehicle license
more than made up for the additional costs of daily coupons. 114
Notwithstanding these loopholes, Singapore’s use of a quantity-based market
mechanism was considered successful in curbing vehicle growth in Christian
Iaione’s comparative case studies.115 Indeed, the rationale of the Singapore
109
Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, Curbing Urban Traffic Congestion in Singapore: A
Comprehensive Review, 37(2) TRANSPORTATION J. 24, 28-29 (1997); see Certificate of Entitlement, supra
note 12, at cols. 728-29 (Mah Bow Tan).
110
Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan).
111
Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 28. As a simple illustration, say there are two
COEs to be issued, and there are three bids submitted at the amount of one, two, and three dollars,
respectively. Under the Singapore auction rules, the bids of two dollars and three dollars are successful
bids, and both successful bidders will each pay two dollars for their COE. This differs from the current
Shanghai auction, where the two successful bidders will pay two dollars and three dollars, respectively.
112
Iaione, supra note 7, at 930; Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 26-27 (providing
a detailed breakdown of car prices).
113
Iaione, supra note 7, at 931; Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 28-29. The
transferability restriction mandates the successful bidder of the COE to register a vehicle in one’s own
name within six months to avoid forfeiting the COEs.
See
ONE MOTORING,
http://www.onemotoring.com.sg/publish/onemotoring/en/lta_information_guidelines/buy___sell_a_used/O
wnership_Transfer/transfer_fee_computation.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). The registration of the
vehicle that the COE is applied to cannot be transferred within three months of registration and can only be
transferred between the 4th and 6th month upon payment of any increase in COEs’ value between the time
of COE bidding and the time of transfer. Id.
114
See Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 20-21.
115
Iaione, supra note 7, at 929-32.
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government for imposing the quota 116 echoed Christian Iaione’s
justifications for quantity control over price mechanisms.117
Interestingly, during Singapore’s legislative debate on the
implementation of the COEs, queuing and balloting were expressly rejected
as methods of allocation because of the windfall profit for those who were
merely quick to line up or just lucky. 118 The Minister in charge of
transportation noted that “[i]t is the Government’s responsibility to collect
the market price for the COEs and to use the substantial revenue so collected
for public projects which can benefit everyone.”119 The Minister also argued
that the revenue collected helped balance the budget and reduced the need to
raise taxes. 120 Indeed, the Singapore government credited the substantial
revenue levied on car ownership as an important reason for the lowering of
income tax rates.121 A legislator also noted that while transportation policies
relating to car ownership did not affect the majority of the population who
were not car owners, the policy could still be potentially detrimental to them.
Failure to recoup the windfall to car owners from government regulatory
actions would result in less government revenue available for public
projects.122
2.

Area Licensing Scheme and Electronic Road Pricing: Pioneering
Congestion Pricing

In 1975, Singapore became the first country in the world to implement
congestion pricing to manage traffic congestion in its business and finance
district. 123 Under the Area Licensing Scheme, a paper license had to be
purchased and displayed on the vehicle for entry into the central business
district during morning peak hours.124 Technology advancement in recent
times has allowed Singapore to introduce an even more sophisticated
Electronic Road Pricing system (“ERP”). The use of electronic card readers
allows for reliable automatic fee collection every time the vehicle passes
116

Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, 54 HANSARD (Sing.) Col. 934, Col. 936937 (1990) (Hong Hai).
117
Iaione, supra note 7, at 908-10.
118
See Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan).
119
Id. at col. 730.
120
Id.
121
Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at col. 953 (Heng
Chiang Meng).
122
Id.
123
See Schuitema, supra note 6, at 100; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 17.
124
Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 17; see also Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang,
supra note 109, at 24-25.
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under the gantries.125 More importantly, the rates are regularly fine-tuned to
reflect changes in actual usage (i.e., congestion) of roads. A targeted speed
benchmark is set based on the engineering capacities of the roads, and the
rates are reviewed quarterly in response to the measured speed on those
roads, with rates decreasing upon higher speed and vice-versa. 126 In
addition, the rates are adjusted to anticipate changes in traffic flow, such as
lower rates during school holidays in which peak-hour traffic is lower.127 A
reduction in taxes related to vehicle ownership (including road taxes and
motor vehicle registration fees, but not fuel tax) was also introduced in 2004
to ease possible public objections for the scheme.128
The Singapore government justified the congestion charges as being
for the “privilege to drive into the restricted area”129 and as a “better use of
our limited road space,” 130 particularly in light of the economic and
environmental costs of congestion.131 The Singapore government in recent
years has emphasized that congestion pricing is not a revenue-generating
measure, noting the amount of the total vehicle and road tax reduction
implemented in conjunction with the congestion pricing is less than the
projected increase in revenues from congestion pricing.132
The Singapore congestion pricing regime has generally been
considered a success by international and American commentators in
reducing traffic and relieving congestion in the district.133 However, some
empirical studies indicate that the measures may have gone too far, leading
to under-utilized roads to the detriment of overall welfare.134 Nonetheless,
its success “is at least somewhat responsible for the increased attention paid
to congestion pricing regimes domestically [in the United States].”135

125

See Iaione, supra note 7, at 918; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 21-22; Rex S.
Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 30-31.
126
Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 22.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 23.
129
Budget, Ministry of Communications, Hansard (Sing.) (Mar. 19, 1975) vol. 34 at col 583 (Yong
Nyuk Lin, Minister for Communications).
130
Electronic Road Pricing, Hansard (Sing.) (12 Oct. 1998) vol. 69 at cols 1297-1298 (Mah Bow Tan,
Minister for Communications).
131
Electronic Road Pricing (Shift in Use), Hansard (Sing.) (Feb. 15, 2008) vol. 84 at cols 317-321
(Raymond Lim Siang Keat, Minister for Transport).
132
Id. at col. 322 (Raymond Lim Siang Keat, Minister for Transport).
133
Iaione, supra note 7, at 917-18; see Schuitema, supra note 6, at 99-100; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex
S. Toh, supra note 35, at 24.
134
Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 20 (discussing the various empirical studies);
see Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 25.
135
See Nash, supra note 7, at 723.
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IV.

MARKET MECHANISMS THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

The comparison of traffic congestion policies in the United States,
China and Singapore reveals a divergence in regulatory approaches. One
particular feature that emerges is the stronger commitment to market-based
mechanisms in Singapore’s regulatory approach compared to the United
States and China. This part explains how the differences in traffic
congestion policies reflect the respective underlying conception of public
property in the three jurisdictions.
A.

Market-based Mechanisms and the Public Property Protection
Justification

Market-based mechanisms are predominantly featured in the traffic
congestion policies of Singapore. Whether in terms of price-based
instruments or quantity-based instruments, Singapore leads the way. In
contrast, the utilization of market-based mechanisms remains haphazard in
China and the United States. This is somewhat ironic, especially for the
United States, because the common perception is that the cultural and
ideological affinity for market and property rights in the United States
allows for greater and faster implementation of market-based regulatory
solutions.136
Of course, the fact that market-based mechanisms enjoy greater actual
implementation in a non-U.S. jurisdiction is not in itself particularly unusual.
Chile is often noted as an example in which the free market economic
thought of the Chicago School enjoys much greater manifestation than in the
United States. 137 In particular, the Chilean privatization reform of
pensions 138 echoed the United States’ reform proposal of private social
security accounts 139 that purportedly reflects the American cultural
136

See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 11, at 420-21 & n.6 (2002); Sinden, supra note 11, at 534-38 (noting
with skepticism the United States’ unquestioning preference for market solutions).
137
See Judith Teichman, Merging the Modern and Traditional: Market Reform in Chile and
Argentina, 37 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 23, 26-30 (2004).
138
Joseph J. Norton, Privatization of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for
International Standards, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 817, 841-51 (1998). Chile’s reform involved switching the
pension from a defined contribution scheme to a defined benefit scheme with individual account. Id. In
essence, the amount an individual would receive during retirement is now directly tied to the individual’s
contributed amount and the performance of the individual’s investment choice for the contributed amount.
Id. For comparative analysis of Chilean pension schemes with that of other countries, see Elizabeth D.
Tedrow, Social Security Privatization in Other Countries: What Lessons Can be Learned for the United
States?, 14 ELDER L.J. 35 (2006).
139
Benjamin A. Templin, Full Funding: The Future of Social Security, 22 J.L. & POL. 395, 395-96
(2006); Tedrow, supra note 138, at 36-38. Proposed by President Bush in 2005-2006, the reform proposal
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imperative of a free market economy.140 The situation of Singapore could be
similar to the Chilean experience, which resulted from an unorthodox
alliance of Chile’s authoritarian regime with a close-knit group of
technocrats.141
What is interesting is the rationale for adopting a market-based
mechanism in Singapore over other allocation mechanisms, such as lottery
or queuing. Aside from the typical economic efficiency arguments of
allocating resources to the highest value users and lowering regulatory
costs,142 an important justification was to collect adequate charges for the
benefits accruing to private entities.143 A critical justification alluded to in
the Singapore legislative debate is the concept of vehicle licenses as a public
resource for which the government has a responsibility to recoup fair
value. 144 The congestion charges were also justified as a charge for the
“privilege to drive into the restricted area”145 and the “use of our limited
road space.”146
In essence, adopting market-based mechanisms appears to be based on
a key pillar of socialist ideologies: the protection of public property.147 In
the eyes of the Singapore government, regulatory permits and roads are
publicly owned property that should only be allocated upon collection of
appropriate charges from recipients. Because market-based mechanisms—
whether competitive auctions or prices based on market transactions—are
the most effective means to ensure that the government collects maximum
value for these resources, such mechanisms are the preferred allocation
devices for the Singapore government.
This insight into the justifications for the market-based mechanisms in
Singapore raises two interesting points. First, Singapore’s government is
adopting market-based mechanisms pursuant to its ideology of public
property protection rather than an affinity towards free-market or private
property. Second, the Singapore approach differs greatly from the policies
evoked an intense political debate and backlash. Templin, supra. The proposal is actually quite modest,
involving only a partial privatization model where workers have the option to set aside four percent of the
payable payroll taxes into their own private retirement account. Id.
140
Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security
Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 980-81 & 1012 (2000); Templin, supra note 139, at 402 (describing a
free market economy as “a system of personal ownership and personal responsibility”).
141
Teichman, supra note 137.
142
See Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan) (“COEs will go to the
persons who value them most and who are able and willing to pay.”).
143
See supra Part III.D.1; Budget, Ministry of Communications, supra note 129.
144
See supra Part III.D.1.
145
See Budget, Ministry of Communications, supra note 127.
146
Electronic Road Pricing, supra note 130, at Col. 1297-1298.
147
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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adopted in China, even though protection of public property is otherwise
featured prominently in the legal and public discourses in China. The
remainder of this part addresses these two matters by critically examining
the concept of public property in Singapore, China, and the United States.
B.

China: Too Little “Property” in “Public Property”

One notable difference between the traffic congestion policies in
China and Singapore is that while quotas for vehicle licenses are utilized in
both jurisdictions, market auction as an allocation mechanism is rarer in
China. This section explains that while public property is heavily
emphasized under the ostensibly Chinese Socialist regime, regulatory
permits are not typically regarded as property that should be allocated to
private entities only upon receipt of valuable consideration.
1.

Emphasis in Public Property Protection Under Chinese Socialist
Ideology

Protection of public property is of the utmost importance in China.
China has been under the tight reigns of the Chinese Communist Party since
1949.148 Notwithstanding a series of social and economic reforms since the
1980s,149 China’s communist and socialist ideological tradition remains a
dominant influence in law and policies, particularly in terms of rhetoric.150
One distinct manifestation of this ideology is its emphasis on protecting
public property. 151 The Chinese Constitution gave public property
148

See Mo Zhang, supra note 13, at 324-25.
For discussions of the history of Chinese reform especially after 1979, see generally JING
WEIMING ET AL., JINGJI ZHUANXING ZHONG DE SHICHANG SHEHUI ZHUYI – GUOWAI MAKE SI ZHUYI DE FENXI
YU SHIJIAN JIANYAN [MARKET SOCIALIST IN THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION: THE ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL
EXAMINATION FROM FOREIGN MARXIST] 202-06 (2009); ZHONGGUO JINGJI TIZHI GAIGE 30 NIAN HUIGU YU
ZHANWANG [30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING AHEAD ] 36-42 (Wei
liqun ed., 2008).
149

150

Wuquan fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 3 (China) (“In the primary stage of socialism, the state upholds the basic
economic system under which the public ownership shall play a dominant role and diversified forms of
ownership may develop side by side.”). See also XIANFA [Constitution] Preamble (2004) (China). For a
discussion of the ideological evolution of China’s socio-economic model since 1949, see Mo Zhang, supra
note 13, at 325-37.
151
Public ownership is essential in socialist economy, though progressive socialist thinkers argue that
it encompasses more than state ownership. See, e.g., GE YANG, JINGJI ZHUANXING QI GONGYOU
CHANQUAN ZHIDU DE YANHUA YU JIESHI [EVOLUTION AND EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC-OWNED PROPERTY
SYSTEM DURING ECONOMIC TRANSITION] 40-61 (2009); JING WEIMING ET AL., supra note 149, at 38-42.
After wiping out private economic entities during the period of 1960s and 1970s, private entities were
gradually allowed since the 1978 market reform. See 30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA:
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“inviolable” status152 long before it recognized private property in 2004.153
This is not surprising because a major platform of the Chinese Communist
party is instituting a socialist state whereby public ownership is the dominant
form of ownership in the country. 154 Public ownership of property is
deemed crucial for the survival and prosperity of the infant socialist state.155
Notwithstanding the transition into a “socialist market economy” and the
increased recognition of the economic contributions from privately owned
entities, publicly owned property continues to be viewed as a fundamental
pillar of the Chinese state.156
This emphasis on public property protection manifests in Chinese law
and public discourse. In addition to Article 12 of the Constitution stipulating
the “inviolable” nature of public property, Article 53 expressly includes the
protection of public property as the duty of the Chinese citizen. 157 The
“sacred and inviolable” nature of state property and its collective ownership
by “the whole people” is reiterated in Article 73 of the Principles of Civil
Law. 158 The infringement of state property is also a specific ground for
criminal penalties under the Criminal Law. 159 A Chinese government
hospital even utilized the argument that charging for hot water that was
previously free was necessary to prevent loss of state property.160
REFLECTING AND LOOKING AHEAD, supra note 149, at 36-42. Nonetheless, official policies until 2000
envisaged private economic activities as merely supplementary of state-owned economic activities. See id.
152
This protection has been enshrined since the second version of the constitution. See XIANFA
[CONSTITUTION] art. 8 (1975) (China) (“Socialist public property is inviolable. The state protects socialist
public property. Appropriation or damaging of state or collective property by any organization or
individual by whatever means is prohibited.”).
153
XIANFA [Constitution] art 13 (2004) (China) (“The lawful private property of citizens may not be
encroached upon. The state protects by law the right of citizens to own private property and the right to
inherit private property. The state may, for the public interest, expropriate or take over private property of
citizens for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with the law.”). Earlier mention of private
property has been at best lukewarm. See, e.g., XIANFA [Constitution] art. 13 (1982) (China) (“The state
protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property. The
state protects according to law the right of citizens to inherit private property.”).
154
XIANFA [Constitution], art. 6 (2004) (China).
155
30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING AHEAD, supra note 149, at
36-41; GE YANG, supra note 151, at 40-61 (discussing the evolution of China’s property ownership regime).
156

Wuquan Fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China); 30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING
AHEAD, supra note 149, at 42; Mo Zhang, supra note 13, at 338-41.
157
XIANFA [Constitution], art. 53 (2004) (China).
158
Minfa Tongzhe [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (China).
159
Xing Fa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct.
1, 1997, amended Feb. 25, 2011) (China).
160
Lin Yunlin, Kunming Duojia Yiyuan gong Reshui Shoufei pa Gouyou Zichan Liushi? [Several
Hospitals in Kunming Charges for Hot Water – Fear of Loss of State-owned Property?], LIANHE ZAOBAO
(Sing.), Mar. 25, 2011.
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2.

“Regulatory Property”: Regulatory Permit as Public Property?

The divergence in regulatory approaches between Singapore and
China in the allocation mechanism for vehicle license quotas lies in the
differing conceptualizations of public property. The Singapore government
recognizes the economic value of these vehicle licenses and treats them as
valuable public property that should not be allocated without collection of
appropriate charges. Conversely, Chinese jurisprudence adopts a narrower
conception of property that precludes recognizing regulatory permits as
public property.
a.

Ambiguous status of intangible property

One obstacle towards the recognition of regulatory permits as public
property is the hesitation under Chinese jurisprudence towards recognition
of property rights in intangible property. While the enactment of the
Property Law in 2007 is viewed as a monumental milestone in the
recognition and protection of property rights, including private property
rights, 161 the prevailing view in China is that intangible property is not
covered by the Property Law. Prominent Chinese property rights scholar
Limin Wang emphasized that the Property Law is primarily meant for
tangible property and argued for a distinction in the legal treatment of
intangible property.162 Professors Yihua Zhang and Xiaojing Luo similarly
opined that intangible property is, as a matter of principle, not covered by
the general law of the Property Law 163 even as they recognized that the
international trend is an increased emphasis on the economic value of
property as the defining characteristic of property rights.164 Indeed, while
Articles 45 to 58 of the Property Law set forth different types of property
owned by the state or collectives, the only intangible property explicitly
referred to is the telecommunication spectrum.165
Part of the confusion arises because of terminology. The English
translations of both caichan quan and wuquan is “property rights” even

161
LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, WUQUAN FA [REAL RIGHT LAW] 36-37 (5th ed., 2008); Mo
Zhang, supra note 13, at 336-37.
162
WANG LIMIN, WUQUAN FALUN [PROPERTY LAW ] 13-15 (2d ed., 2008).
163
WUQUAN FAXUE [PROPERTY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE] 31-32 (Zhang Yihua & Luo Xiaojing eds.,
2010).
164
Id.
165
Id.
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though the two phrases have different meanings.166 Wuquan has a narrower
meaning, and generally refers to tangible property, as discussed in the
previous paragraph. Caichan quan, conversely, is given an essentially
economic definition as rights to certain economic interests. 167 The
interchangeable use of the concepts is unfortunately common. For example,
Liang Huixing and Chen Huabin, in their textbook on the Property Law,
seem to regard them as equal in their discussion on the relationship between
the constitutional protection of property (“caichan”) and the Property Law
provisions against property infringement (“wuquan”).168 The Property Law
(“law on wuquan”) itself only serves to confuse matters because while the
bulk of the statute addresses conventional tangible property, there is a
special chapter on ownership that addresses various state-owned property
extensively in the broader economic sense (“stated-owned caichan”). 169
Indeed, Article 45 provides a catchall provision that property (“caichan”)
that is deemed to be owned by the state under the law shall be owned by the
state.
The exclusion of intangible property from the Property Law does not
mean that intangible property is not recognized and protected under the law.
Chinese academics do recognize that state-owned property (“caichan”) does
include intangible property.170 There is also legal recognition in the courts
that the business transactions of state-owned enterprises are part of their
assets.171 Limin Wang’s exclusion of intangible property from the Property
Law is premised on his argument that specific legislation that regulates
matters relating to different classes of intangible property.172 This approach
is indeed reflected in a recent interpretative book by the official law
publisher for the State Council legal office. 173 Thus, while intangible
property is not precluded from legal recognition as a form of property, the
content and extent of legal protection (or the lack thereof) is contingent on
specific legislation dealing with the particular form of intangible property.
In the particular context of regulatory permits, the analysis of whether

166
167
168

See supra notes 160-165.
PROPERTY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 163, at 31; Mo Zhang, supra note 13, at 322.
LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, supra note 161, at 39-41.

169

Wuquan fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China).
170
LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, supra note 161, at 39-41.
171

Wuquan fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China).
172
WANG LIMIN, supra note 162.
173
WUQUAN FAX IN JIEDU [NEW INTERPRETATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS LAW] 4-5 (2010).
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regulatory permits are part of public property (“caichan”) is dependent on
the law governing regulatory permits—the Administrative Permit Law.174
b.

Administrative permits under the administrative permit law

The Administrative Permit Law was enacted in 2003 to enhance
administrative accountability and governance in China.175 The “legislative
purpose clause” of the Administrative Permit Law framed the law as
regulating administrative permits to protect the legal rights and interests of
private entities and to promote the public interest and social order.176 The
official legislative explanation of this clause also emphasizes the goal of
effective implementation of the system of administrative permits and
protecting the citizens and other private entities.177 This emphasis is echoed
in the judicial interpretation of the Administrative Permit Law as well.178
The recognition of administrative permits as a form of public property
requiring valuable considerations before transfer to private entities is prima
facie incompatible with the ostensible legislative focus on protecting private
entities.
The Administrative Permit Law does envision the use of market
auctions as the allocation mechanism for regulatory permits under certain
circumstances. Article 53 read together with Article 12(2) of the
Administrative Permit Law provides for the use of “tender, auction and other
fair competitive measures” as the default means of allocating regulatory
permits concerning the “exploitation of limited natural resources, allocation
of public resources and market entry into industries that involve direct public
interest.” 179 These two provisions were used by Chinese academics to
justify the legality of the Shanghai auction of vehicle licenses. 180 The
official legislative explanation of the Administrative Permit Law also
conceived of the allocation of administrative permits relating to the use of

174
Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative Permit Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004) (China).
175
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGE GUO XINGZHENG XUKE FA SHIYI [EXPLANATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT LAW] 2-7 (Zhang Chunsheng & Li Fei eds., 2003).
176
Administrative Permit Law (P.R.C.), supra note 174, at art. 1.
177
EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT LAW, supra note 175, at 1-8.
178
YANG LINPING, XINGZHENG XUKE SIFA JISHI LIJIE YU SHIYONG [UNDERSTANDING AND
APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT] 32-40 (2010).
179
Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative Permit Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004) (China).
180
Yang Xiaojun & Huang Quan, supra note 63, at 109.
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public or natural resources as analogous to a transfer of property rights and
interests (“caichan quanli”) by the country to the permit holders.181
3.

Comparison with Singapore

While Article 53 and Article 12(2) of the Administrative Permits Law
seem to support the conceptualization of those regulatory permits as a form
of property, there is a subtle but important distinction between this and the
Singapore approach. China’s recognition of the economic value of the
administrative permit is tied to the economic value of the underlying
resources. This perspective works well for regulatory permits that allow
direct exploitation or use of certain economically valuable resources, such as
land, minerals, forestry, and telecommunication spectrums.182 For example,
the requirement to pay a substantial monetary sum for an administrative
permit to extract a certain amount of minerals or timber is legitimate and
desirable because the permit holder is getting valuable resources in return.
However, this perspective does not work well for regulatory permits
whose economic value to the holder derives primarily from their mere
scarcity instead of the conventionally perceived value of the activity
permitted by the regulatory permits. This accounts for the strong and
persistent resistance to the use of a market auction to allocate vehicle
licenses under a vehicle license quota scheme. Notwithstanding the
occasional academic support for the legality of Shanghai’s auction, 183 the
common refrain against the Shanghai auction stems from the payment of
perceived “exorbitant” prices for the mere “basic” right to own a vehicle.184
This is particularly important because the vehicle license quota system itself
is also said to sacrifice an individual’s right to car usage.185 In a 2011 article
in a prominent Chinese legal journal, Hu Lvyin made a concerted effort to
defend the legality of the Shanghai auction. However, his approach of
advocating a non-conventional interpretation of the Property Law that views
Shanghai’s auction as essentially auctioning the economically valuable right
of road usage 186 reflects the need to justify the high price of regulatory
permits through the value of the activities.
181

EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT LAW, supra note 175, at 191.
Id. at 173-74.
183
Yang Xiaojun & Huang Quan, supra note 63.
184
See, e.g., “Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of Shanghai’s Management of Traffic
Congestion, supra note 65 (quipping about Shanghai vehicle plates as the world’s most expensive license
plate).
185
Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent, supra note 68.
186
Hu Lvyin, supra note 72, at 7.
182
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The Singaporean government, in contrast, relies on the economic
value of the regulatory permits without emphasizing the economic value of
the activities permitted. In the legislative debates on allocation mechanisms
for the COEs, the justifications centered on the “windfall profit” that
recipients might receive from queuing or balloting and how these recipients
can simply cash in on the profit by selling the vehicle licenses to those who
actually need the vehicles.187 Legislators did not rely on the economic value
of car ownership to COE holders nor the costs to the government in
providing the transportation infrastructure to accommodate the road usage as
justifications for the high and rising prices of the COEs.188
This approach is relevant for the other common forms of regulatory
permits that provide substantial economic value to the holder, but are not
conventionally associated with exploitation or use of valuable public
resources. The approval for change of land use or change in land use density
under a development permit can dramatically increase the value of land for
the permit holder.189 However, there is only a tangential relationship with
the use of valuable resources (natural or public).190 The Singapore planning
authority grants development permits for alterations of land use (including
increasing land use intensity) only after the payment of development
charges. 191 The Ministry of National Development sets the rate in
consultation with the Chief Valuer, who takes into account current market
values,192 which are currently set at 70% of the appreciation in land value.193
187
Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan); Select Committee Report on
Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at col. 953 (Heng Chiang Meng).
188
Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan). Indeed, the COEs quota
system was initially conceived as a price mechanism to “restrain” road usage without explicit mention of
revenue generation. See Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at col.
953 (Heng Chiang Meng).
189
Tom Allen, Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative
View, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 75, 95 (Robin Paul
Malloy ed., 2008) (comparing the valuation of GBP 7000 per hectare of mixed use agricultural land versus
GBP 2.6 million per hectare of residential “bulk” land).
190
It may be theoretically possible to conceive of development permits as essentially allocating the
scarce public resources of land use, where space among built-up areas at any given location is limited.
However, it is very uncommon for discourses about granting development permits to revolve around
resource allocation.
191
Planning (Amendment) Bill, 23 HANSARD (Sing.) Col. 146 (statement of Lim Kim San, Minister
for National Development) (1964); William J. M. Ricquier, Compulsory Purchase in Singapore, in TAKING
LAND—COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 263, 277 (Tsuyoshi
Kotaka & David L. Callies ed., 2002).
192
Kalpana Rashiwala, Prime Residential DC seen rising 20-35%; But Potential En Bloc Sellers
remain Upbeat due to Positive Outlook, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 10, 2007.
193
Planning (Development Charges) Rules (Cap. 232, Section 40, 2007 Rev. Ed.) §10 (Sing.). See
also Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency with Board Takings Powers and
Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 34
(2010).
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The crucial aspect of Singapore’s development permit regime is that the
development charges are premised on the “windfall” 194 or “increases in
value of land” 195 to the permit holders. There was no discussion of
development permits involving allocation of scarce natural or public
resources, as would be required to levy substantial monetary considerations
under the Chinese Administrative Permit Law.196
C.

United States: Too Much “Public” in “Public Property”

The difficulty Chinese jurisprudence has in conceiving of regulatory
permits as a form of property can be contrasted with the conception of
property in the United States that recognizes regulatory permits and other
forms of government regulatory actions as forms of property. However, the
lack of market-based mechanisms in the United States permeates not just its
traffic congestion policies, but in other policy realms as well. This section
traces the evolution of regulatory property and explains how the resistance
toward market auction of regulatory permits in the United States is due to
the one-sided “propertization” of regulatory property that predominantly
emphasizes protection of personal constitutional liberty while overlooking
the initial allocation aspect of property. In addition, this section highlights
how the association of public access with public property in the United
States impedes the implementation of congestion pricing on public roads.
1.

Reich’s New Property, Regulatory Property and Statutory Property

Despite its relatively recent development, the conceptualization of
regulatory permits and other forms of government regulatory action as forms
of property has become increasingly well established in common law
jurisdictions. The starting point of the “new property” is inevitably the
seminal 1963 article by Charles A. Reich aptly titled “The New Property.”197
In this article, Reich highlighted various forms of government-created
wealth, including regulatory actions such as occupational licenses and
franchises.198 He proposed the creation of private property rights, or rights

194
Planning (Amendment) Bill, 41 HANSARD (Sing.) col. 449 (statement of The Cheang Wan,
Minister for National Development) (1982).
195
Id. (Lim Kim San).
196
See supra Part IV B.2.b.
197
Reich, supra note 16.
198
Id. at 734-37.
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of a similar nature, in this government-created wealth, with the aim of
limiting governmental discretion in its allocation and recall.199
Reich’s pioneering work led to the development of the “regulatory
property” concept. Bruce Yandle and Andrew P. Morriss identified
“regulatory property” (“a property right created and allocated by a
government entity”) as a distinct category from the commons, common
property, public property and private property.200 Steven J. Eagle referred to
the term “regulatory property” in describing the valuable regulatory permits
that are essentially government-created monopoly privileges. 201 Shi-Ling
Hsu defines regulatory property as “property which is governmentally
created by unbundling an asset from a regulated right and simultaneously
imposing some restrictions on the regulated right and assigning some
sovereignty over that right, such as the right to alienate.” 202 Michael L.
Wells and Alice E. Snedeker discussed the similar concept of “state-created
property” that originates from laws and government actions and typically
includes “jobs, building plans, business licenses, and other benefits that can
only be taken away for cause.”203 Indeed, there has been increased judicial
recognition of property in various regulatory licenses and benefits that has in
turn allowed the imposition of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.204
The concept of regulatory permits as property rights has been picked
up in other common law jurisdictions as well. Australian courts recognized
“statutory property”—property rights arising from bureaucraticadministrative regulations. 205 The context typically involves the issue of
constitutional takings; for example, whether a privatized former state-owned
telecommunications enterprise can be compelled to allow competitors’
access to its network hardware under statutorily determined compensation
rates that are allegedly lower than market value206 or whether replacing bore
licenses (for water) granted under previous legislation with bore licenses that
199

Id. at 778-85.
Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2001).
201
Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L. REV. 1229, 1239
(2010).
202
Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 813, 879 (2003).
203
Wells & Snedeker, supra note 17, at 207.
204
Id. at 172-77 (providing a good summary discussion on the various U.S. court cases on these
issues); Lehavi, supra note 17, at 156-57.
205
Kevin Gray, Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust, 32 SYDNEY L.
REV. 221, 224-25 (2010) (discussing the Australian High Court case of Telstra Corporation Ltd v
Commonwealth that confirmed the existence of this autonomous form of property).
206
Id. at 222-24 (Telstra Corporation Ltd v Commonwealth).
200
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contain fewer entitlements under new legislation is a taking.207 The courts in
both cases recognized the property nature of the regulatory permits/licenses,
but ultimately dismissed the takings challenge on the basis that these
statutory property rights are defined by the ambit of the underlying statutes
and are thus inherently fragile.208 In New Zealand, Thomas Gibbons has
argued for the recognition of property rights in regulatory permits such as
resource consents.209
2.

Differing Purposes: Creation of Personal Property Rights vs.
Appreciation of Public Property Allocation

An important feature of these developments is that the recognition of
new forms of property in various government regulatory actions is premised
primarily on protecting the rights and interests of individuals and not those
of the state. Academics frequently emphasize the individual-safeguarding
aspect of the new property.210 Individual liberty is also in the forefront of
Reich’s work. 211 Indeed, he later wrote of the need to “create more
ownership rights” in these forms of government-created wealth to safeguard
liberty.212
There are others who recognize “new property” for reasons other than
to protect individual liberty. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown proposed
recognizing a work visa as a form of Reich’s new property,213 with the goal
that such conception would facilitate her proposal that financial
intermediaries (e.g., banks) serve as guarantors for visa applicants. 214
However, this is entirely unnecessary because the proposal neither touches
on the spirit of Reich’s new property (protecting private individuals) nor
involves any property at all (her plan is about incentives for enforcement).
Indeed, she differentiates her proposal from other “hard” utilizations of
market mechanisms that involve allocating visas based on a hefty entry price
or even an auction, noting that her plan merely serves to mitigate the
207
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information asymmetry in visa matters (by co-opting private financial
intermediaries for screening and enforcement purposes). 215 Kevin Gray
analogizes this “statutory property” and the correlative “regulatory property”
with the quasi-public trust216 to justify the “coupling of commercial privilege
with social obligations” (i.e., facilitating limitations for the public interest on
otherwise private property).217 This renders his reference to Reich’s “new
property” 218 a little ironic and arguably misconceived.219
In any event, the protection of individual liberty and safeguarding
individual rights remains the predominant theme in the recognition of such
“new property” as regulatory permits and other government actions. Of
course, there is nothing wrong per se in such a justification for “new
property.” Indeed, the expansion of government in both expenditures and
scope renders such government-created wealth even more important220 and
has the dangerous side-effect of magnifying governmental power and
dominion over private individuals through the inherent accessory powers
arising from discretion and choice in wealth allocation.221 This increases
dependence of individuals on the government and risks making
compromising one’s individual rights a condition of accepting this
government-created wealth.222 This state of affairs also aggravates social
inequality because powerful, wealthy, and well-organized interest groups
can be expected to co-opt the government in furtherance of their interests, to
the detriment of the broader society.223
The current emphasis on the liberty-safeguarding functions of new
property is problematic because it often ends up focusing only on situations
that involve the deprivation of these rights. Wells and Snedeker argue that
recognizing new property in “jobs, building plans, business licenses, and
other benefits” is necessary because it “addresses the constitutional problem
created by the tension between persons in a free society entitled to rely on
keeping rights they have acquired, and the government seeking (for good or
bad reasons) to take those interests away.”224 While Reich’s original work
215
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discusses in some detail the proposed limits on governmental discretion in
allocating this property, his primary concern is the imposition of
“unconstitutional conditions” on the granting of such rights and the inclusion
of considerations that are irrelevant to the regulatory power. 225 He also
opined on the need for procedural safeguards, including the requirement of a
fair hearing following the denial of any privilege or benefit,226 adding that
higher standards should be applied to governmental actions that have the
effect of a penal sanction.227
The other important aspect of property—the initial allocation
mechanisms—is often overlooked to the extent that it does not implicate
personal liberty or rights. Thus, granting regulatory permits without
receiving valuable consideration in exchange posed no problems for Reich
and like-minded academics. 228 Indeed, such free allocations are even
encouraged. 229 This is in contrast with traditional forms of government
property, such as real property (e.g., land) or government contracts, where
any allocation or distribution to private entities without adequate
consideration will almost inevitably raise a red flag. For example,
“newspapers and magazines have been filled with articles about awarding of
noncompetitive contracts to politically connected companies.”230 The small
costs borne by private developers in the acquisition of land via eminent
domain adds to controversies relating to eminent domain. 231 Such
considerations are conspicuously absent in the discourse about new property.
One possible justification for this distinction is that “new” property
typically emanates from regulatory actions of the government in which
allocations are already premised on public interests considerations. For
225
226
227
228
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example, the allocation of telecommunication spectrum licenses without
collection of any monetary considerations was justified on the basis that the
allocations were and should be made based on considerations of public
interest rather than profit-making potential. 232 Thus, it is unnecessary to
consider whether market value has been charged for these regulatory permits
and new property. This argument mitigates, but does not resolve the
criticism. Allocation of traditional property frequently comes with public
interest conditions. For example, public land may be sold or leased with
conditions attached, such as maintaining public access or achieving
conservation goals. 233 Government contracts may also be set aside
specifically for small businesses or for minority-owned or female-owned
businesses to support these socially and economically disadvantaged
groups. 234 The attachment of conditions premised on public interest
considerations is a factor that can reduce or even negate the monetary
considerations that the government might otherwise recoup.235 Nonetheless,
it is only a factor. The starting point in deciding the appropriate allocation of
property, whether traditional property or new property, should include
consideration of whether monetary charges based on the market values of
this property should be imposed.
This deficiency can be observed in the context of the allocation of
regulatory permits for the use of the telecommunication spectrum. Prior to
1981, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted the
command-and-control approach, allocating spectrum use through
“comparative hearings.”236 Given the great value of the licenses allocated
and substantial discretion afforded to the FCC, political peddling was an
232
John A. Rogovin & Rodger D. Citron, Lessons from the Nextwave Saga: The Federal
Communications Commission, the Courts and the Use of Market Forms to Perform Public Functions, 57
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FCC, and the Public Interest, 15(4) J. POL’Y HISTORY 389, 407-12 (2003) (noting the important public
interest considerations that are overlooked under an auction allocation mechanisms of broadcast licenses);
Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 35-36 (1959).
233
Michael I. Jeffery, Public Lands Reform: A Reluctant Leap into the Abyss, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 79,
116-17 (1996).
234
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PROCUREMENT, AND LEGAL CHANGE 167-75 (2007) (discussing the practices and constitutionality of
affirmative policies in U.S. government procurement).
235
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26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475, 485 n.30 (2003).
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unsurprising feature of such hearings.237 Protests about the arbitrariness of
regulatory allocation prompted the allocation to be replaced in 1981 by a
lottery in which most of the licenses awarded by the lottery were resold.238
However, there remained room for political influence because entry into the
lottery was subject to certain qualifications that were determined by the
authorities.239 Indeed, the legislative history of the federal licensing regime
is characterized by legislators maximizing “political support by arbitrating a
rent-seeking competition for valuable licenses.”240 It was only in 1993 that
Congress finally authorized the FCC to auction spectrum licenses through
competitive bidding.241 In 1997, bidding was made mandatory for future
licensing proceedings with limited exemptions.242
The substantial economic value of these regulatory permits relating to
the use of the telecommunication spectrum has never been questioned.
However, it is significant that the issue has never really been framed the
perspective of public property allocation. The primary rationale for the
adoption of a market auction remains awarding licenses to the highest
valuers. 243 There have been attempts to justify market auction through
analogizing spectrum use to conventional property (such as the use of
pasture or logging rights).244 Nonetheless, such arguments failed to stick.
Indeed, the “modern consensus” of the United States’ spectrum policy is that
market mechanisms (including auction and secondary markets) are the
preferred methods for assigning spectrum rights because the primary goal is
to allocate the spectrum to its highest value use.245 While the “[r]ecovery for
the public of a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made
available for commercial use” was also stated as an objective underlying the
new auction mechanism in the 1990s,246 this was primarily in response to the
substantial budgetary pressure facing the government at that time247 instead
of a genuine appreciation of the public property nature of the regulatory
237
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permits. Even the increasing emphasis on the revenue-generating aspect of
spectrum auction in recent times is premised on the efficiency of this form of
revenue generation compared to distorting incentives from conventional
taxes. 248 It is difficult to imagine a similar tortuous evolution in the
allocation of traditional property, such as land or government contracts.
This contrasts markedly with Singapore’s approach. When selecting
the mechanism of allocating its 3G telecommunication licenses in 2001, the
Singapore government decided on a competitive auction instead of a “beauty
contest” mechanism in which the regulatory authority was forced to decide
on the merits of the applications of telecommunication service providers.249
As with the justifications advanced in support of the use of the auction
mechanism in allocating COEs, 250 an important rationale driving the
Singapore government’s decision is the prevention of “immediate windfall
profit” under the “beauty contest” system.251 The Minister expressly stated
that “the Government has a responsibility to obtain fair value for a scarce
resource.”252
Thus, while regulatory permits are recognized as “property” in both
the United States and Singapore, the premise for their recognition is
different. The United States’ recognition is driven by the desire to introduce
safeguards to the recipients and beneficiaries of government regulatory
actions. Conversely, the recognition in Singapore is to facilitate the claim of
public ownership on the economic values of these regulatory actions.
3.

Two Types of Public Property

The other feature of United States discourse surrounding public
property is that the “public” in public property can indicate two things.
First, it can indicate “public” as opposed to “private” ownership. This is
salient in the context of inter-government takings as the U.S. Supreme Court
clarified that eminent domain of publicly owned property is subject to just
compensation even though the Fifth Amendment refers only to “private
248
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property.”253 “Public” ownership is also relevant in the application of the
Establishment Clause, where display of religious symbols on publicly owned
property (but not privately owned property) risks violating the prohibition on
the state’s establishment of religion.254 The loss and squandering of publicly
owned property is also an important theme in the discourse of corruption.255
There is, however, another common, but different understanding of
public property. Public property is also often associated with public access.
For example, David Fagundes’s critique about the lack of public outrage
over the loss of public property when the Supreme Court upheld the
Copyright Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft256 (extending copyright
protection by twenty years returns what should otherwise be public property
back to private hands)257 assumes that public property signifies property with
public access.258 Legal scholar Amnon Lehavi recognized that it is easy to
conflate property with “private property” when there are different types of
property regimes such as common property, public property, and openaccess property.259 Public property is again conceptualized as property that
is utilized by the public. 260 Bruce Yandle and Andrew P. Morriss’s
classification of property into common property, public property, private
property, and regulatory property focused on the entity controlling the
property, with public property being “property controlled by government.”261
They observed that the appropriate level of management for the resources
may depend on the circumstances.262 Inherent in their analysis, however, is
that public control of “public property” assumes a certain degree of public
access by contrast with the more exclusive “private property.”263 Carol M.
Rose’s conceptualization of public property in her critical examinations on

253
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental
Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 831 (1989).
254
E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989).
255
E.g., Thomas R. Snider, Combating Corruption Through International Law in Africa: A
Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 707 (2007) (discussing the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption); Osita Nnamani Ogbu, Combating Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the
Laws, Institutions, and the Political Will, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 146-48 (2008).
256
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
257
David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 652-58 (2010).
258
Id. at 677-88.
259
Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 2004 (2008).
260
Lehavi, supra note 17, at 141-42.
261
Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 129
262
Id. at 138.
263
Id. at 136, 138.

38

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 1

the problems arising from the exclusive nature of private property similarly
assumes public ownership and public access.264
The association of public property with public use and public access
can be traced to ancient Roman law, which recognized that certain property
cannot be privately owned or was exclusive to the public. 265 The first
category is res communes – property that cannot be legally owned, but
which the right to enjoy by all is recognized by the law.266 Typical examples
include air, running water, and the sea. 267 Another similar concept, res
publicae, involves property such as public roads, rivers, and harbors that are
typically owned by the state, but which private property interest can exist
therein. However, regardless of ownership, the public cannot be excluded
from access and enjoyment.268 This Roman tradition of treating roads and
other key avenues of transportation as classic public property to which
public access should be ensured is carried on in the American public trust
doctrine.269
This conceptualization of at least some forms of public property as
property where the public is entitled the right to access helps to account for
the prevailing opposition towards congestion pricing and other tolls. As
Carlos Sun observed, “[s]ome believe that travelling is a right and that roads

264
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are public goods, and as such they should be ‘free.’”270 In the context of the
New York City congestion-pricing proposal, opponents argued about the
“fundamental fairness problems of charging access to public streets.” 271
Opponents also allude to the ideal of roads being accessed by all, rich and
poor.272 Indeed, Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill observed “[w]e
tend to think of public property as something open to all members of the
public on equal terms.”273 Elsewhere, in India, “the creation of toll roads
remains anathema to many Indians, who see roads as public property for
trucks, rickshaws and ox-carts alike.”274
Part of the problem is the conflation of public access with free public
access. Carol M. Rose correctly pointed out that public access does not
necessarily imply absence of government intervention.275 Nonetheless, her
categorization of the primary goal of government intervention as ensuring
orderly access of public property by private entities 276 still renders
ambiguous whether the imposition of fees or license quotas is an affront
towards public access. Rose acknowledged that toll roads are permissible
“if the public is otherwise adequately served.” 277 However, this simply
leaves open the question of whether the amount of toll levied is a factor in
determining whether the public is adequately served. In particular, it is
arguable that high toll charges on key transport routes—despite their
necessity due to severe congestion—would have violated even Rose’s more
nuanced understanding of public access.
The Singapore government, conversely, justified the congestion
charges as a charge for the “privilege to drive into the restricted area.”278 In
a similar vein, the government has no hesitation to speak about using
congestion prices to “control,” 279 “regulate,” 280 and “restrain” 281 traffic.
270
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constitutional rights that guarantee citizens to move freely between states, to visit another state, or to enjoy
state benefits after relocation.”).
271
Dan Janison, Spin Cycle: A New Spin on Traffic Plan?, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 7, 2007, at
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Indeed, when a more draconian vehicle restriction mechanism that was
similar to the “odds and evens” license plate vehicle authorization282 was
rejected, the rationale was that “[t]his is much too high a level of restriction
on the movement of private cars for the time being.” 283 The concept of
public access to roads does not feature prominently in Singapore discourse
about roads management. The next Part will argue that this decoupling of
public access from public property is a preferable approach.
PUBLIC PROPERTY REEXAMINED

V.

The comparative analysis in the previous Part highlights the
divergence in the conceptualization of public property in the United States,
China, and Singapore. Drawing from the approach in Singapore, this Part
advances a framework of public property that involves a broad economic
understanding of “property” to include regulatory permits and a reorientation
of “public” that focuses on public ownership and not public access.
A.

What Should “Public Property” Mean?

How should public property be properly conceived? To answer that
question, this Part analyzes the definition of “property,” the definition of
“public,” and the relationship between public property and other forms of
property.
1.

“Property”

It is useful to start with the “property” part of “public property.” A
narrow definition of property that excludes valuable resources is
undesirable. In particular, the concept of property should include regulatory
permits and other regulatory actions that confer economic benefits to
recipients. 284 From the economics perspective, there is no fundamental
281
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distinction between “property” and “regulation” because both can be equally
valuable.285 This is particularly true for regulatory permits whose numbers
are limited under a regulatory scheme. 286 The holder of these limited
regulatory permits, such as the taxi medallions in New York City, enjoys
economically valuable de facto monopolistic rent that accounts for its high
price.287 The fact that some of these regulatory permits are tradable further
enhances their value. The right of alienation of an asset accounts for a large
portion of its value by allowing a higher value (or more efficient) user to
obtain the asset. 288
A conceptualization of property that does not include these regulatory
permits is incomplete for two reasons. First, the important issue about the
efficient allocation of these public resources is sidestepped. Efficiency
considerations of resource allocation typically involves an analysis of the
following three factors: whether the property is allocated to the highest value
user, whether there are any externalities (positive or negative) associated
with its use, and the cost of the allocation process.289 Regulatory permits
and other regulatory licenses, particularly those that are limited in number,
typically represent rights to resource utilization. The nature of regulatory
permits and other regulatory actions usually indicates that the externalities
consideration dominates the allocation decision and typically manifests in
various forms of public interest considerations upon which allocation
decisions are based.290 Thus, telecommunications spectrum licenses might
be allocated to television stations engaging in public broadcasting that is
deemed to be beneficial to the public,291 or development permits (such as
zoning decisions) may be granted to projects that benefit the surrounding
neighborhood.292
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However, there are many other instances where the highest value user
consideration should have taken a more prominent role. For example, in the
case of limited vehicle license regimes in selected Chinese cities, ensuring
that the vehicle licenses go to users who value vehicle usage the most is
particularly important in terms of the overall efficiency of the regulatory
scheme (beyond the narrow category of non-profit vehicle usage, such as
ambulances, police vehicles, and other public service vehicles that are
typically exempted from the quota in any event).293 Similarly, there are few
reasons why allocation to the highest value users should not be the primary
allocation factor for commercial users in the context of the
telecommunications spectrum. 294 In both instances, the limitation in the
number of permits and licenses under the respective regulatory schemes is
necessary to tackle the negative externalities arising from the use of
resources. However, inefficiency in the form of underutilization of
resources can still occur during the allocation of the permits and licenses if
the recipients of such permits and licenses are not in a position to make full
use of the permits and licenses.295
Second, failure to frame the allocation of regulatory permits as an
allocation of public property obscures the potential wealth transfers that take
place in these regulatory decisions. Regulatory permits represent substantial
economic value for the select few to whom they are allocated. Recipients of
the vehicles licenses in Beijing lottery allocation are essentially winners of a
state-sponsored lottery. There might, of course, be scenarios in which such
wealth transfers are intended and desirable. The role of such wealth
redistribution in the proposed definition of “public property” will be
explored further in the next section. The main considerations for now are
scenarios in which redistribution is not the primary consideration of the
particular regulatory regime. Vehicle license permits and the management of
traffic congestion in general are not set up to help vulnerable or socioeconomically disadvantaged communities. In these scenarios, ignoring the
substantial wealth transfer in regulatory allocation decisions invites
corruption and rent-seeking 296 into the allocation process. 297 The

293
One example is a special set-aside of ten percent of the total vehicles license quota for public
interest organizations in Beijing. See Zhou An, supra note 66.
294
Goodman, supra note 243, at 352-53.
295
This is especially so where there are restrictions on transfers (which are common for regulatory
permits) or there are significant transaction costs that impede secondary trading.
296
Rent-seeking is the process by which private entities seek to increase their share of existing wealth
via exploiting the political process for redistributing wealth. For a recent general restatement on rentseeking, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (2005).
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government’s regulatory powers are a fertile source of rent.298 Indeed, rent
seeking involves power-holders utilizing their power to create “new”
property rights that generate a flow of income to themselves.299 It is possible
to conceptualize the government power to redistribute entitlements as a form
of property, with public corruption as a form of theft.300
In the same vein, this wealth transfer also represents a huge loss to the
public coffers. In the absence of ostensible redistributive considerations,
there is little justification for private entities deriving huge benefits from
government regulatory actions. Even if transfers are ostensibly prohibited
under the regulatory scheme, creative corporate structuring and other
contractual arrangements can still allow regulatory permit holders to enjoy
huge benefits by effectively “selling” the permits to others. In the case of
the telecommunication spectrum allocation during the pre-auction days in
the United States, the telecommunication spectrum licenses were essentially
sold at high prices via transfers of ownership by the radio and television
stations. 301 Indeed, “virtually all current spectrum licenses paid for their
spectrum” as a result of the fact that almost all broadcast stations have
experienced at least one ownership change since receiving their broadcast
licenses. 302 Similarly, a lucky winner of the otherwise non-transferable
Beijing vehicle licenses can obtain huge monetary payments through a
“long-term lease” of their vehicles.303 Conversely, huge public revenues are
derived from the auctioning of such vehicle licenses in Shanghai and
Singapore. This allows the government to capture economic benefits that
are otherwise randomly allocated to private entities without any coherent
redistributive considerations. This loss of public revenue not only implicates
fairness issues in which some individuals enjoy particular benefits at the
expense of the public, 304 but also affects efficiency because revenue

297
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302
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generated through the sale of public resources/assets do not share the
identical distorting incentives from conventional taxes.305
2.

“Public”

The “public” in “public property” should be reoriented to focus on
public ownership rather than public access or public utilization. The current
conceptualization of public property tends to include public utilization or
access as one of its defining characteristics.
The danger of this
conceptualization is that it fuses the two separate issues of ownership and
allocation, which involve different and distinct analytical considerations.
This preempts the otherwise important question of the appropriate mode of
its allocation. Stipulating that resources should be available for public
utilization is merely a form of an allocation decision—it can be changed and
should be changed depending on the prevailing socio-economic conditions
and the available technologies.306
Public access as a means of allocating resources enjoys the critical
advantages of low enforcement costs and can be efficient under
circumstances in which the risk of resource over-exploitation is low and the
utilization of resources imposes minimal negative externalities on other
users. However, these circumstances are not constant, and resources that are
efficiently allocated via public access in an earlier age may require other
modes of allocation in later times. Technology advancement may reduce the
costs of other allocation mechanisms while increased density of utilization
(e.g., through population growth) may give rise to over-exploitation and/or
negative externalities. For example, national parks are typical public
property.307 Nonetheless, as overcrowding arising from increased demand
leads to the degradation of the enjoyment of the visitors and of the natural
environment, 308 implementing a limited quota of park permits 309 or
increasing user fees for the park310 may be necessary to conserve its natural
value. Indeed, the institution of private property is largely irrelevant where
305
See Hazlett, Muňoz & Avanzini, supra note 248, at ¶26-27; Hazlett, Porter & Smith, supra note
248, at 140.
306
See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 167-68.
307
Id. at 129. See also Jeffery, supra note 236 at 97-103 (discussing the establishment of National
Parks in the United States and noting the rationale of ensuring access and enjoyment of all citizens).
308
Jeffery, supra note 236, at 100-01; Catherine M. Pickering & Ralf C. Buckley, Swarming the
Summit: Managing Tourists at Mt Kosciuszko, Australia, 23 MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 230, 231-32 (2003).
309
Pickering & Buckley, supra note 308, at 232-33.
310
Jeffery, supra note 236, at 132-33 (noting the disparity in revenue generated by the low user fees
and the high costs of operating expenses in the United States and the practice in Kenya of charging high
fees for foreign nationals but low fees for locals).
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there is an abundance of resources, 311 but may be necessary to avoid the
tragedies of the commons in the light of intense competing use.312
This danger is demonstrated in the strong public resistance towards
congestion pricing in the United States. There is opposition to congestion
pricing and other restrictions on vehicle usage in part because these
allocation schemes infringe on the perceived right of public access. 313
Indeed, public roads have been the quintessential public property with
inherent rights of public access since Roman times.314 While the allocation
mechanisms of public access were arguably efficient at that time, the modern
reality of the high density of users challenges the continued efficiency of
such an allocation. Similarly, technological advancement has substantially
reduced the cost of alternative allocation mechanisms. Singapore congestion
pricing was facilitated by the emergence of affordable electronic transponder
technology.315 However, the assumption of public access—or worse, public
free access 316 —as the defining characteristic of a certain class of public
property unnecessarily impedes the adoption of otherwise effective
mechanisms to alleviate the real social costs imposed by congestion.
Hence, the defining characteristics of “public” in “public property”
should be “public ownership.” The fact that a property owned by the public
is subject to public access merely represents that public access is the
allocation mechanism that the public (via its governing institution) has
chosen for that particular property. As an allocation mechanism, public
access may be normatively desirable after taking into account public interest
considerations such as redistribution. Public access may also be at times the
most economically efficient allocation mechanism for those resources.
However, the public, through the appropriate governing institution, should
be allowed to freely change its chosen allocation mechanisms in response to
changes in public interest considerations or changes in technology and
utilization patterns.

311
312

Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 304; Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 2, at 717-18.
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313
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3.

The Relationship Between Public Property and Other Forms of
Property

The decoupling of public access from “public property” clarifies the
relationship between public property and the other forms of property
arrangements. Public property tends to be regarded either as a form of
property arrangement, parallel to private property, common property and
others,317 or as the starting point of an evolutionary process that ends with
private property.318 The proper relationship should be neither. Just like how
public access is merely an allocation mechanism, the other property
arrangements are allocation mechanisms as well, be it the emphasis of
identifiable ownership under private property, 319 the heavy government
intervention in regulatory property,320 or the hybrid property arrangements
that can involve varying combinations of private, common, and public
elements.321 Thus, under the proposed public property framework, private
property is simply public property that is allocated through discrete (and
often alienable) private rights to resources. Similarly, the collective property
in China where villagers’ committees enjoyed some form of autonomous
control and ownership over rural land 322 is another form of allocating
publicly-owned property in a legal regime that was hostile towards private
property.
The proposed public property framework does not make any
normative claim about the appropriate allocation mechanism, which would
involve a context-specific inquiry into the various considerations such as
transaction costs, resources scarcity, redistribution, and equality.323 Rather,
the normative thrust of the proposed framework is simply that where
allocation of publicly owned resources is involved (including the continued
utilization of public access as means of allocation), it will be up to the
317
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319
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appropriate entity or entities empowered and entrusted with collective
decision-making on behalf of the public to select the appropriate allocation
mechanism.
There is inevitably debate on the identity of the decision-maker and
the manner of the decision-making process. 324 There may be internal
conflicts between the different public bodies, such as tension between local
and central government325 or between different government agencies.326 The
jurisdictional lacuna for resources that lies beyond national boundary (e.g.,
fisheries) 327 or that span across jurisdiction (e.g., greenhouse emission) 328
can also impede meaningful decision-making on the allocation mechanism.
Such issues of governance and institutional design are beyond the scope of
this article. Nonetheless, the proposed public property framework will
emphasize that insofar as there is an operational governance structure in
place to represent the otherwise amorphous notion of public, there will
usually be an entity (or entities) that can and should consciously make these
allocation decisions.
B.

Redistribution, Government Incentive and Regulatory Burden

Conceiving of public property to include regulatory permits while
downplaying the right of public access is not without controversy. The
objections can be sorted into two categories. First, there are concerns about
the adverse redistribution effects whereby the low-income segment of the
population would be excluded in the market allocation of regulatory permits
and public resources that were previously allocated without charge. Second,
the potential for raising revenue through the market allocation of these
“new” public property rights risks distracting government from the exclusive
pursuit of genuine public interest goals. These objections will be addressed
324
E.g., Lehavi, supra note 259 (arguing that major decisions on arranging property rights should be
made by government entities entrusted with the power and duty of collective decision-making, i.e.
legislative and administrative bodies).
325
E.g., Schill, supra note 253, at 880-88 (arguing that just compensation for takings of publiclyowned property is justified to protect local and state government from the nation’s political process).
326
E.g., Scott R. Christensen & Akin Rabibhadana, Exit, Voice, and the Depletion of Open Access
Resources: The Political Bases of Property Rights in Thailand, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 639, 643-54 (1994)
(discussing the bureaucratic conflict among the different government agencies that plagued and inhibited
land use in Thailand).
327
See Robert J. McManus, America’s Saltwater Fisheries: So Few Fish, So Many Fishermen, 9(4)
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 13, 13 (1995) (noting the “creeping jurisdiction” initiated by the United States
in the 1960s to enforce regulatory control on water surface previously excluded from national regulation).
328
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below, together with the affirmative case for how the proposed definition of
public property promotes efficiency and reduces rent seeking.
1.

Redistribution and “Fairness”

A common objection to the use of market mechanisms to allocate
regulatory permits and public property with public access is that imposing
monetary charges disadvantages those who are poor. As discussed above,
the main objection to congestion pricing in the United States 329 and China330
is that such fees pose barriers to travel for those with less income. Public
resistance to large monetary charges attached to vehicle licenses under the
Shanghai auction also accounted for the switch to the free lottery allocation
in subsequent vehicle license quotas.331 The practice of charging steep entry
fees to Chinese natural, cultural, and historic tourist attractions has prompted
Chinese commentators to express skepticism about the market allocation of
the “public property” of these national monuments because of the resulting
social inequality.332
These criticisms of inequality are misconceived. First, conceiving of
public property as not including public access does not preclude the
government from implementing redistributive activities to aid the poor. Just
as governments can institute social welfare programs that directly allocate
cash and other property to certain target communities such as the poor,
disabled, or aged, governments may allocate valuable regulatory permits to
those targeted communities on the basis of express redistributive goals. The
restraint resulting from the proposed framework is merely a requirement to
expressly declare the redistributive purposes whenever beneficial regulatory
actions are undertaken, i.e., when regulatory permits are allocated without
imposing the appropriate charges or fees based on the value received by the
beneficiaries. It is true that vague redistributive justifications may simply be
offered and political checks may not be sufficiently robust to ensure the
requirement serves any meaningful constraints, which is evidenced by the
sometimes blatant wealth transfers undertaken by the government to
influential interests groups.333 Nonetheless, this is an improvement because
the prima facie expectation that appropriate charges are based on the benefits
received should raise the bar for government justification of beneficial
329
330
331
332
333
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regulatory decisions. The government must not merely articulate some form
of public interest consideration to justify the regulatory decision (as they do
now); instead, the government should have to explain why these public
interests considerations trump the need to collect the charges. The increase
in public and media scrutiny that is associated with the outrage over the
losses of public property to the benefit of private entities also helps to rein in
potentially massive wealth transfers in the realm of regulatory actions.
Second, even if a market allocation mechanism is adopted for the
allocation of the public property, redistributive goals to the poor are not
necessarily advanced under a non-market-based allocation mechanism. The
alternative to a market-based allocation is often not targeted redistributive
efforts, but merely “free access” or allocation without charges. The absence
of charges does not necessarily benefit the poor. In the case study of the
allocation of Chinese vehicle licenses, the lucky winners under the lottery
system in Beijing received their licenses for free, but there is little to suggest
that they deserved the substantial economic value deriving from the
licenses.334 Allocation based on standing in line or lottery merely grants the
windfall profit to those who are quick to line up in the queue or who are
lucky, as noted in the Singapore legislative debate.335 Similarly, allowing
public property to be allocated through “public access” favors segments of
the population that are poised to exploit the resources. In the case of
fisheries, that may simply include large corporations with the capital and
expertise to out fish local and native fishermen.336 In the case of roads, time
becomes the price charged for road utilization.337 This does not benefit the
poor, particularly when the rich can “save” time by purchasing property in a
better location.338
If redistribution were a priority, collecting the market fees and
redistributing the collected funds would provide a more effective means to
redistribute wealth. Shanghai’s practice of using the proceeds from the
auction to subsidize important public transportation initiatives, such as
rebates for public transportation transfers, free public transportation for the
334
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elderly and subsidies for remote public transportation routes 339 does much
more to help the socioeconomically disadvantaged communities than the
random lottery allocation mechanisms in Beijing and Guiyang. Similarly,
the reduction of broad-based taxes under Singapore’s practice of charging
substantial fees for beneficial regulatory actions helps to keep general taxes
low. Singapore has managed to consistently maintain a healthy budget
surplus while enjoying some of the lowest income and corporate tax rates in
the world, particularly compared with the United States and European
countries.340 More tellingly, unlike in the United States,341 the amount of
government fees and charges collected are significant in comparison with
the revenue from general taxes and is one of the key components to these
budget surpluses. 342 This budget surplus has allowed the Singapore
government to undertake massive redistribution projects, including
providing affordable public housing for 80% of its densely populated urban
population and a substantial government subsidy on education.343
This healthy fiscal position is important for effective redistribution
because revenue generated through the sale of public resources and assets
does not share the same distorting incentives of conventional taxes. 344
Indeed, taxation is often viewed simply as a revenue-producing device but is
in fact one of the far-reaching powers of the government that can impose
real costs on private property rights.345 Some scholars consider taxation as a
form of eminent domain, even arguing that some tax laws are actually
unconstitutional takings.346 Broadly based taxes such as income taxes and
corporate taxes do not treat all taxpayers fairly but benefit certain groups of

339
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citizens at the expense of others.347 Tax laws are subject to intense lobbying
pressures, often resulting in provisions catering to interest groups at the
expense of general taxpayers.348
In summary, while redistribution is ultimately dependent on political
will rather than how public property is conceived, the proposed public
property framework and the corresponding use of market mechanisms are
more effective and efficient in generating resources that can be utilized for
redistribution.
2.

Revenue Generation vs. Public Interest

Another critique points to the perverse incentives created by the
potential for revenue generation when regulatory permits and public-access
property are conceived as “property” that could be “sold” to private entities.
This is socially harmful because it may lead to an increase in unnecessary
regulation as a result of the government’s financial incentives in imposing
regulatory regimes that charge recipients for regulatory permits or licenses.
The government may also skew the design and exercise of regulatory
regimes towards revenue generation instead of genuine public interest. In
the context of spectrum auctions, commentators have highlighted the danger
of revenue generation distracting government regulatory authorities from
enhancing the overall efficiency of society, such as ensuring that resources
are fully utilized and maintaining a competitive market. 349 This is
particularly relevant because the regulatory design underlying the permit
auctions heavily influences the bids made, unlike the sale of a governmentowned physical commodity (such as oil or timber).350 Revenue-generating
tactics that are not consistent with general social welfare include delaying
the auctions (to wait for higher bids), high reserve pricing, and reducing the
number of permits offered for auction (possibly granting monopoly power
through licensing). 351 Administrative auction can also impose artificial
scarcity to drive up prices, leading to insufficient supply of the regulatory
permits.352 Chinese commentators have also criticized the Shanghai vehicle
license auction on the grounds that such maximizing of government funds
347
See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 292 (1990);
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348
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349
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350
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351
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352
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will distract the government from achieving public welfare.353 In a similar
vein, several Chinese academics have begun advocating public access as the
main criterion for the classification of property as public in an attempt to
limit governmental ability to utilize market mechanisms (i.e., charging
market rates) in allocating property that should properly be freely accessible
by the public.354
The danger of governments pursuing revenue at the expense of public
welfare is a legitimate concern. However, the abuse of government power is
neither caused nor aggravated by the proposed conceptualization of public
property. The cause of revenue generation dominating the government
calculus in the United States is the budget deficit. It was the fiscal crisis in
the early 1990s that finally induced the implementation of the auction for the
telecommunication spectrum licenses. 355 Similarly, faced with dwindling
budgets, local governments in the United States have integrated land use
planning and zoning efforts with municipal financial planning goals,
resulting in “regulat[ing] for revenue.” 356 A consistent approach towards
recognizing the “public property” nature of regulatory permits may actually
reduce perverse incentives to generate government revenue at the expense of
social welfare. As discussed in the previous section, the aggressive use of
market mechanisms in Singapore has generated substantial revenue that
helps lead to healthy budget surpluses in a comparatively low-tax
environment. 357 In such a context, the distorting pressure to generate
revenue in the design and implementation of any particular regulatory policy
is reduced. It is noteworthy that while congestion pricing in Singapore is
conceived of as the market allocation of a public property, it is not a revenue
generating measure because of the greater reduction in road and vehicle
taxes. 358 Indeed, the lack of a budgetary deficit crisis in Singapore has
allowed the government to simultaneously increase the number of COEs
issued even though such increase in supply is likely to reduce revenue from
the COE auction.359
353
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Moreover, the greater risk to improper exercise of regulatory power is
not government regulating for financial gains, but rent-seeking by special
interests groups. Regulatory schemes that adopt market allocation and
generate revenues for the government typically trigger massive popular
objections, as evidenced by the political resistance to implement congestion
charges in the United States or the popular objections against auction
allocation of vehicle licenses in China. 360 Conversely, rent-seeking is
rampant in regulatory regimes that allocate regulatory permits and licenses
without charge, resulting in real and substantial economic benefits to the
recipients. Throughout history and particularly in the modern administrative
state, the state has an indispensable and crucial role in the establishment and
rearrangement of property rights through its regulatory power.361 When the
state has the power to manipulate or redistribute individuals’ property rights,
the risk of rent -seeking arises where special interest groups devote resources
to persuade the state to manipulate or redistribute property rights in their
favor.362 The vigorous political lobbying in the pre-auction allocation of the
telecommunication spectrum363 or the unfortunately common corruption in
the grant of development permits364 demonstrates the greater danger of rentseeking in thwarting the proper exercise of regulatory power.
In this regard, conceptualizing regulatory permits as public property
that prima facie should not be given away to private entities actually helps to
reduce corruption and rent-seeking. As observed by Nobel Prize laureate in
economics, Ronald Coase, “if these rights were disposed of to the highest
bidder, the main reason for these improper activities [of improper influences
exercised by politicians and businessman] would disappear.”365 Similarly,
Bruce Yandle noted that “[s]adly for special interest groups, user fees tend to
maintain competition and generate no rents for [these groups].”366 Interest
groups would be much more careful to lobby for government actions if they
are expected to pay for these benefits.367
360
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Of course, the recognition that allocation of regulatory permits is
essentially the allocation of public property does not in itself eradicate
corruption and rent-seeking. Corruption remains a persistent problem in the
realm of government contracts and the sale of government assets368 despite
the ostensible jurisprudential emphasis on the need for government to obtain
best value for the public funds and property.369 Nonetheless, the expectation
and recognition that beneficial regulatory actions should not be dispensed
free-of-charge in the absence of explicit redistributive considerations is at
least an improvement on the current situation in which no such scrutiny
automatically attaches to regulatory decisions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A comparative analysis of the prevalent use of market-based
mechanisms in allocating public resources and regulatory permits in the
regulatory landscape of Singapore presents a paradox because Singapore’s
regulatory approach is both more market-oriented than the United States and
more oriented towards public property protection than socialist China. In
truth, the paradox is easily resolved through the lens of public property.
Public property, the otherwise sacred poster child of socialist regimes, is
simply a form of property. If market mechanisms represent the most
effective form of property allocation to ensure that public property is not
squandered—and often they do—then an emphasis on public property
protection will necessarily imply the widespread use of market
mechanisms.370 Similarly, the use of market mechanisms to assign public
resources and regulatory permits to the highest value user would also
inevitably generate substantial revenue for the public coffers. From this
perspective, it is not surprising that Singapore is the shinning epitome of
both socialist public property protection and market-oriented regulatory
approach. One should inevitably lead to the other, and vice versa.
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However, a reorientation of public property is necessary to achieve the
goals of efficiency and public revenue fairness. The definition of “property”
in public property must be sufficiently broadened to include regulatory
permits and other regulatory actions that bestow substantial economic value
to the recipients. This is crucial to avoid unfortunate and unnecessary losses
of efficiency and public revenue such as the lottery allocation of China’s
vehicle license quota and the pre-1993 allocation of U.S. telecommunication
spectrum licenses. Both scenarios are in part caused by the failure to
appreciate that public property allocation is at stake. Similarly, the “public”
in public property should not be defined by public access. Public access is
merely a form of allocation. It may prove to be the most efficient allocation
mechanism through the ages, but this historical tradition should not impede
adoption of other allocation mechanisms upon alterations in use patterns
arising from technological advancement and socioeconomic changes. The
severe congestion problem has rendered road usage in densely populated
urban areas prime candidates for a switch from public free access to marketbased allocation mechanisms. In a world of ever increasing scarcity of
previously abundant resources, the refined public property framework
proposed in this article provides greater conceptual clarity in resource
allocation and externality management.

